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Prison Objectives and Human Dignity: 
Reaching a Mutual Accommodation 
Melvin Gutterman* 
The mood and temper of the public 
in regard to the treatment of crime 
and criminals is one of the most unfailing 
tests of the civilization of any country. 
Winston Churchill, 19 12' 
Imprisonment as practiced in our country today is an 
experiment in punishment and reformation that began about 
200 years ago.%s a method of changing human behavior, it 
has been a failure. There is an "endless, self-defeating cycle of 
imprisonment, release, and reimprisonment which fails to alter 
undesirable attitudes and beha~ior."~ 
Today, our criminal law dockets are full, our jails are 
overcrowded, and almost every state is enlarging its 
correctional facilities to accommodate more inmates. With more 
than one million people behind bars, our highly civilized 
country can now claim the dubious distinction of imprisoning 
more of its citizens, per capita, than any other ~oun t ry .~  
* Professor of Law, Emory University. B.A., 1959, University of Michigan; J.D., 
1962, Brooklyn Law School; L.L.M., 1967, Northwestern University. 
I would like to thank my colleague, John Witte Jr., and my wife, Judy 
Gutterman, for their many helpful suggestions in preparing this Article. 
1. Quoted in Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594, 596-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
2. For an excellent general discussion on the early development of American 
prisons, see DAVID J .  ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM 78-108 (1971), 
and HARRY E. BARNES, THE REPRESSION OF CRIME (1926). 
3. President Johnson's Message to Congress, 1 PUB. PAPERS 263, 264 (Mar. 8, 
1965). 
4. A recent study by The Sentencing Project, a nonprofit research organization, 
finds the American incarceration rate to be 426 people per 100,000, well in excess 
of South Africa (333), the second-highest imprisonment rate, and the then Soviet 
Union (268), the third in overall incarceration. The Nation: U.S. Leads in Share of 
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The legal status of those persons convicted of committing a 
criminal act was long ignored by the courts. A century ago, the 
criminal offender was regarded as a "slave of the StateF5 
thereby providing prison administrators' acts with virtual 
immunity from judicial review. More recently, the courts took a 
"hands-off"' approach to, the administration of  prison^.^ The 
loss of many of the most important basic rights in the 
institutional setting was blithely accepted as a necessary 
condition of rehabilitation, discipline, or security. 
Today, with judicial prodding, prisons are beginning to  
shed their "punitive heritage."' "[Tlhe soul-chilling inhumanity 
of conditions in American prisons has been thrust upon the 
judicial conscien~e."~ The Supreme Court, although recognizing 
that prisoners are not wholly without protection of the 
Constit~tion,~ has continually failed to honor all but the most 
basic of human needs. The lower federal courts, however, have 
emerged as the force behind the efforts to ameliorate inhumane 
conditions in our prisons.1° 
For the most part, federal judicial intervention has been 
beneficial t o  the correctional system and the broader 
community. l1 However, progress toward providing both 
~esidplnts in Prison, ATLANTA J. &  CON^., Jan. 5, 1991, at A5. 
In 1988, the latest year for which figures are available, the Federal Bureau of 
Justice Statistics indicated that about one million people were in prison or jails, 
and that 2.3 million people were on probation. In the last decade, the population 
of prisons had "increased by 45 percent while the number of those on probation 
jumped by 75 percent." Stephen Labaton, Glutted Probation System Puts 
Communities in Peril, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1990, at Al, A16. 
5. Ruffm v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871). 
6. For a historical review of the "hands-off theory, see Note, Beyond the Ken 
of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 
72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963). 
7. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 598 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting in 
part, concurring in the result in part). 
8. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 684 (D. 
Mass. 1973), afd, 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Hall v. Inmates 
of Suffolk County Jail, 419 U.S. 977 (1974). 
9. Wolff, 418 U.S. a t  555-57. 
10. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 359 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurridg 
in the judgment). 
11. Id. at 359-60 (citing M. KAY HARRIS & DUDLEY D. SPILLER, JR., U.S. DEP'T 
OF J~JSTICE, AFTER DECISION: IMPLEMENTATION OF JUDICIAL DECREES IN 
CORRECTIONAL S ~ I N G S  2 1(1977)). 
Justice B r e ~ a n  also quotes prison officials who have acknowledged that 
judicial intervention has helped them gain needed reform. Id. a t  360-61. For 
example, the Commissioner of Corrections of New York City, stated: "Federal 
courts may be the last resort for us . . . . If there's going to be change, I think 
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constitutional rights and humane conditions of confinement in 
the nation's prisons has been slow and uneven despite this 
pressure. 
Prisoner litigation has posed a sharp choice between 
respect for human dignity and the need for prison security. 
Prison administrators have the difficult task of preserving 
security in an explosive environment. To ensure that the courts 
afford appropriate deference t o  those charged with operating a 
prison, the Supreme Court has decided that a prison regulation 
is valid if it is "reasonably related to legitimate penological 
interests"12 and does not represent "an exaggerated response 
to those concerns."13 
This Article in Part I1 explores the rise of the penitentiary 
system in our country. Part I11 examines the development of 
the Supreme Court's position on prisoners' rights and 
conditions of confinement. Part IV elaborates on this 
development under the Court's newly minted "reasonably 
related" standard. Part V discusses the underlying reasons why 
the Court counsels judicial restraint and deference to  the 
judgment of prison administrations; nevertheless, this Article 
argues that such judgment is often based on misplaced 
assumptions of administrative expertise and an overly narrow 
view of federalism and the separation of powers. Part VI 
maintains that there is a need to reach a more realistic 
"mutual accommodation between institutional needs and 
objectives and the provisions of the Con~titution."'~ 
This Article contends that the Court's amorphous 
"reasonableness" standard makes it too easy for prison officials 
to restrict basic constitutional rights since they may be 
the federal courts are going to have to force cities and states to spend more money 
on their prisons . . . . I look on the courts as a friend." Id. at 360 (quoting 
Stephen H. Gettinger, "CrueJ and Unusual" Prisons, 3 CORRECTIONS IMAG., Dec. 
1977, a t  3, 5). 
Similarly, the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Corrections 
testified before a congressional committee that lawsuits brought on behalf of prison 
inmates have upgraded correctional institutions and the development of procedural 
safeguards regarding basic constitutional rights. "There is no question in my mind 
that had such court intervention not taken place, these fundamental improvements 
would not have occurred." Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons: Hearings on S. 
1393 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on tht? 
Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 409 (1977) (prepared statement of K e ~ e t h  F. 
Schoen). 
12. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). 
13. Id. at 87, 90. 
14. Wolf'f v. McDonnell, 418 US. 539, 556 (1974). 
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disregarded "whenever the imagination of the warden produces 
a plausible security concern."15 The focus should be on the 
impact of the constitutional deprivation on the inmate and the 
availability of less restrictive, but reasonable, alternatives. The 
guidepost should be to accord, whenever realistically possible, 
respect for the human dignity of the prisoner. 
A. Development of the Pennsylvania and Auburn 
Prison Systems 
Imprisonment as the most common method of punishment 
for the commission of a crime is a relatively recent phenome- 
non. In late eighteenth century England, jails mainly held 
debtors and those accused of committing crimes. Once convict- 
ed, corporal punishment, execution, or banishment were the 
common forms of punishment. Incarceration was very rare.'" 
Colonial America's treatment of prisoners was similar in 
method to its European counterpart. Jails were primarily used 
for holding debtors and those accused of crime.17 Punishment 
consisted of public whipping, branding, carting, or displaying in 
the pillories or stocks. For the more serious offenses, the of- 
fender might have been burned a t  the stake, hanged, or ban- 
ished.18 
It was not until the latter half of the eighteenth century 
that imprisonment in America supplanted corporal punishment 
as the predominant means of dealing with the convicted crimi- 
nal. Just  prior to the outbreak of the Revolutionary War, the 
State of P e ~ s y l v a n i a  began an experiment that radically 
changed the purpose of prisons. Led by Quaker reformists, the 
15. Turner, 482 U.S. at  100-01 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
16. Leonard G. Leverson, Constitutional Limits on th4 Power to Restrict Access 
to Prisons: An Historical Re-Examination, 18 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 409, 412-13 
(1983); see. also WINIFRED A. ELKIN, THE ENGLISH PENAL SYSTEM 110-11 (1957); 
RALPH B. PUGH, IMPRISONMENT IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND (1968). "In early society, 
crimes against the public welfare were punished by summary execution," exile, or 
corporal punishment, according to the nature of the crime and custom of the 
group. BARNES, supra note 2, a t  156. 
17. Jails were rarely used as a place of long-term confinement. At each session 
of the court, a "gaol delivery" emptied the jail of its inmates. Leverson, supra note 
16, at  412. 
18. See DOUGLAS GREENBERG, CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE COLONY 
OF NEW YORK, 1691-1776, a t  223 (1974). 
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Pennsylvania Assembly passed several statutes transforming 
jails into penitentiaries. Richard Wistar, a member of the Soci- 
ety of Friends, was astonished by the misery of the inmates of 
the provincial jail in Philadelphia. Some of the inmates had re- 
cently starved to death, so Wistar had soup prepared in his 
house and distributed it to the inmates of the jail.lg Others 
also became interested in the prison system and formed The 
Philadelphia Society for Assisting Distressed  prisoner^.^' Un- 
fortunately, reform was delayed by the British occupation of 
the city, which put an  end to the Society of Friends' activi- 
tiese2' 
After the American Revolution, the publicity given to the 
deplorable conditions in jail continued, promoting the formation 
of The Philadelphia Society for Alleviating the Miseries of Pub- 
lic Prisons. This organization, the first of the modern prison 
reform movements, set forth with clear and concise terms, in  
its preamble, the purpose of the society. 
[Wlhen we reflect upon the miseries which penury, hunger, 
cold, unnecessary severity, unwholesome apartments, and 
guilt, (the usual attendants of prisons,) involve with them, it 
becomes us to extend our compassion to that part of mankind, 
who are the subjects of these miseries. By the aids of humani- 
ty, their undue and illegal sufferings may be prevented; the 
links which should bind the whole family of mankind togeth- 
er, under all circumstances, be preserved unbroken; and such 
degrees and modes of punishment may be discovered and 
suggested, as may, instead of continuing habits of vice, be- 
come the means of restoring our fellow creatures to virtue and 
happiness.22 
Concurrent with concern for prison reform, a number of 
prominent citizens of Philadelphia, led by Benjamin Franklin, 
organized a movement for the reform of Pennsylvania's barba- 
rous criminal code. By 1794, a systematic revision of the code 
was completed, abolishing the death penalty for most crimes 
and totally eliminating corporal punishment of any type. In its 
place was substituted imprisonment as the normal sentence for 
19. BARNES, supm note 2, at 97-98. 
20. Id. at 98. 
21. Id. 
22. ROBERTS VAUX, NOTICES OF THE ORIGINAL, AND SUCCESSIVE FFORTS TO 
IMPROVE THE DISCIPLINE OF THE PRISON OF PHILADELPHIA, ND TO REFORM THE 
CRIMINAL CODE OF PENNSYLVANIA 11 (1826). 
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felons.23 This break with colonial savagery of punishment ne- 
cessitated the establishment of a prison system to house the 
convicted. 
In 1790, the first American penitentiary was established in 
Philadelphia. The Pennsylvania General Assembly, responding 
to the sentiments of Quaker-led reformists, passed a series of 
laws to transform part of Philadelphia's Walnut Street Jail into 
a ~ e n i t e n t i a r y . ~ ~  The Jail was constructed to confine the worst 
types of felons in solitary ~onf inement .~~  The program, soon to 
become known as the "Pennsylvania system," provided that the 
prisoner be kept in continuous isolation, with all communica- 
tion forbidden, except for religious advisors and official visi- 
tors .26 
The reformists envisioned an  institution where the convict- 
ed would ponder his crime in solitary confinement and in abso- 
lute silence. They believed that the penitentiary would provide 
a place of penitence where the convict, alone in his cell with 
only the Bible to comfort him, would necessarily "be compelled 
to reflect on the error of his ways, to listen to the reproaches of 
conscience, to the expostulations of religi~n.'~' Left in total 
solitude with no evils to distract him, the prisoner would reflect 
on his sins and repent. What the reformists actually hoped for 
were penitentiary houses where kindness and proper direction 
would enable the prisoner to begin his rehabilitation. 
Presaging a modern-day problem, the Walnut Street Jail 
proved a complete failure.28 The cells erected for the more 
hardened criminals were insufficient to accommodate all in- 
mates of this category and thus solitary confinement could not 
be preserved. The Jail became so overcrowded that administra- 
tion of the prison in the scientific manner thought necessary by 
the Quakers became impossible. 
This overcrowding led Pennsylvania to erect the Western 
State Penitentiary near Pittsburgh in 1826 and the Eastern 
State Penitentiary, outside of Philadelphia, in 1829. The 
23. BARNES, supra note 2, at 101. 
24. Id. at 102. 
25. Id.; see also PAUL W. TAPPAN, CRIME, JUSTICE AND CORRECTION 605-06 
(1960). 
26. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 598 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting in 
part, concurring in the result in part). 
27. GEORGE W. SMITH, A DEFENCE OF THE SYSTEM OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 
OF PRISONERS 75 (1833). 
28. BARNES, supra note 2, at 102. 
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reformists were able to convince the legislature to enact their 
fundamental vision of penal administration-solitary confine- 
ment and hard labor.29 
The Pennsylvania program was lavishly praised by its 
inspectors, affirming the wisdom of its reform supporters. 
Shut out from a tumultuous world, and separated from those 
equally guilty with himself, [the prisoner] can indulge his re- 
morse unseen, and find ample opportunity for reflection and 
reformation. His daily intercourse is with good men, who, in 
administering to his necessities, animate his crushed hopes, 
and pour into his ear the oil of joy and consolation. He has 
abundance of light, air, and warmth; he has good and whole- 
some food; he has seasonable and comfortable clothing; he has 
the best of medical attendance; he has books to read, and ink 
and paper to communicate with his friends a t  stated periods; 
and weekly he enjoys the privilege of hearing God's holy word 
expounded by a faithful and zealous Christian minister." 
The Pennsylvania system was the precursor of other state 
reform  movement^.^' The Philadelphia Society had taken the 
lead and had widely advertised its program. Determined to 
make its influence on prison reform felt nationwide, the Society 
corresponded extensively with executives of several states and 
widely distributed information about its program.32 
It  was only natural that Pennsylvania's progress caught 
the attention of New York's Governor John Jay, and that in his 
first message to the legislature, the chief executive recommend- 
ed the reform of the New York criminal code.33 Convinced that 
Pennsylvania had provided the desirable model, the New York 
legislature passed an act that, like its sister state, substantially 
reduced the list of capital crimes and substituted imprisonment 
for corporal punishment? 
Newgate Prison, built in  New York's Greenwich Village, 
was opened in 1797 to accommodate inmates. Like its counter- 
part in Pe~sy lvan ia ,  the Newgate Prison rapidly became over- 
29. 1829 Pa. Laws 351-54. 
30. BARNES, supra note 2, at 104 (quoting Report of the Inspectors of the West- 
ern Penitentiary, Legislative Documents 271 (1854)). 
31. Cf. ORLANDO F. LEWIS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN PRISONS AND PRIS- 
ON CUSTOMS, 1776-1845, at 206-07 (reprinted with the cooperation of The Correc- 
tional Association of New York, Patterson Smith 1967) (1922). 
32. VAUX, supra note 22, at 34. 
33. BARNES, supra note 2, at 105-06. 
34. Id. 
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crowded,35 requiring the construction of a new state prison in 
Auburn, New York. After a period of experimenting with the 
Pennsylvania system of total solitary confinement, Auburn 
adopted the congregate method of confinement. This change 
entailed nothing more than allowing the convicts to work to- 
gether by day, with separation at night, but enforced silence a t  
all times. Nevertheless, this change proved to be historically 
significant. 
A virulent debate arose between the advocates of the Au- 
burn and Pennsylvania systems which raged with intensity 
over several decades.36 In addition, several European coun- 
tries became interested and sent their official investigators to 
evaluate the new experimental  prison^.^' 
Solitary confinement was the essential feature of the Penn- 
sylvania scheme. The key to reforming the convict lay in sepa- 
rating him from evil influences and corrupt companions. 
"Blindfolded upon arrival, he was led to his cell where the 
blindfold was rem~ved."~ The solitary cell, large and well 
ventilated, and its small exercise yard, were his entire world. 
When the time came for his release he was blindfolded again 
and led out.3g The Pennsylvania supporters argued that pris- 
oners confined to their cells at all times did not have to be 
shepherded t o  meals or supervised in workshops; therefore 
guards would not have to be well trained, for their contact with 
these inmates would be minimal. The whip would rarely have 
to be used since prisoners in isolation have few opportunities to 
violate regulations. Furthermore, security was easy to main- 
tain, since isolated inmates would find it Micul t  to formulate 
35. Id. at 106-07. A practice similar to that in effect in our overcrowded pris- 
ons was inaugurated. Each year as many convicts as admitted were pardoned in 
order to keep the prison population down to a reasonable number. Id. at 107. 
36. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, a t  81-83. See BARNES, supra note 2, at 114 11.55, 
for a comprehensive list of articles and pamphlets defending and condemning the 
Pennsylvania system. 
37. BARNES, supm note 2, a t  163. France dispatched Alexis de Tocqueville and 
Gustave Auguste de Beaumont; England sent Sir William Crawford; Prussia sent 
Dr. Nicholas H. Julius. Many wrote invaluable essays on their experiences. See, 
e.g., GLJSTAVE A. DE BEAUMONT & ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, ON THE PENITENTIARY 
SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS APPLICATION I FRANCE (Herman R. Lantz 
ed., Francis Lieber trans., S. 111. U. Press 1964) (1833). 
38. NEW YORK STATE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON ATTICA, A ~ I C A :  THE OFFICIAL 
REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON ATTICA 7 (1972) [herein- 
after ATTICA]. 
39. Id. 
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escape plans.40 
The Auburn school countered that it was unnatural to 
leave inmates in solitary confinement for years at a time. They 
argued that total isolation was "at variance with the human 
con~titution."~~ Minds broke under the strain of idle isolation. 
Far from reforming men, the practice contributed to insanity 
and bred despair. Of equal importance, by permitting convicts 
to work together in silent harmony, they could feel the satisfac- 
tion of hard work and contribute to the cost of their incarcera- 
tion. Besides, the Pennsylvania system was more expensive to 
establish. The Auburn cells were smaller since they were pri- 
marily for sleeping, and not intended to encompass the 
convicts' entire universe. Aided by the growing recognition that 
it was economically cheaper to construct and maintain prisons 
under the Auburn plan, it eventually triumphed and became 
the dominant model for American prisons.42 
The war between the two camps had dominated all think- 
ing on corrections. In retrospect, it is hard to fathom the depth 
of the debate and to understand why it became so passionate. 
The main objective of both the Pennsylvania and Auburn sys- 
tems was to deprive the convict of personal autonomy. Rules 
were designed to control his behavior in every detail. His every 
movement from waking to sleeping was monitored and con- 
trolled.43 Both programs placed maximum emphasis on iso- 
lation in the prison and the establishment of a disciplined rou- 
tine. In both, the inmate was kept in a separate cell a t  night 
and subject to the rule of absolute silence a t  all times. The 
focus was on the one difference rather than on the similarities 
of the two systems. The primary innovation of the congregate 
Auburn system was that inmates worked together during the 
day. 
The narrowness of the content of the debate clearly indicat- 
ed that there was widespread agreement on the institutional 
process. As one prison became overcrowded, another 
fortress-like institution was built. In New York, in 1825, Au- 
burn prisoners helped build Sing Sing on the Hudson River, 
40. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 86. 
41. Id. at 87. 
42. BARNES, supra note 2, at 163-65. 
43. See generally Richard G. Singer, Privacy, Autonomy, and Dignity in Prison: 
A Preliminary Inquiry Concerning Constitutional Aspects of t h  Degradation Process 
in Our Prisons, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 669 (1972). 
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and in 1844, the construction of the Clinton Prison was autho- 
ri~ed. '~ No one questioned the shared basic premise of the 
Pennsylvania and Auburn systems: incarceration was the best 
societal response t o  criminal behavior. 
While those guilty of lesser crimes served their time in 
local jails, the penitentiaries, from the beginning, housed the 
most violent criminals with the longest prison sentences. But 
prison wardens found it difficult t o  morally reform hardened 
inmates who would spend most of their lives behind prison 
walls. Confronted with the problem of coping with the unruly 
prisoner, most wardens reverted to  the practice of whipping 
and chaining. The very punishments that penitentiaries were 
originated to eliminate were now widely used. An impenetrable 
wall of silence between the convict and warden emerged. Fac- 
ing years of incarceration, the prisoners became uncooperative, 
forcing the wardens to increasingly devote their energy to 
maintaining peace and security within their  institution^.^^ 
The Pennsylvania scheme provided for a rigorous system of 
inspection of the ~enitentiary.~~ To the reformers, inspection 
was of utmost importance to discover and redress  abuse^.^' 
The Auburn plan also agreed upon and provided for inspec- 
tioa4' But official inspection proved an uncertain check on the 
defects in the penitentiarie~.~~ Legislative commissions and 
official visitors were unable t o  quell abuses?' A chairman of 
the Board of Inspections wrote that although he frequently 
visited Sing Sing, a New York prison, and gave its affairs close 
inspection, "[ilt was so easy for the officers to conceal even from 
me, with all my attention and vigilance, their abuses of author- 
ity and wanton cruelty.'"' 
When the inmate population increased and became more 
violent, the wardens lost patience with reform. As they loos- 
ened their insistence on silence and separation, security be- 
came a problem. More energy was spent on administration of 
44. A ~ I C A ,  supra note 38, at 11. 
45. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 249-51. 
46. Leverson, supra note 16, at 416. 
47. Id. 
48. Other penitentiaries in Alabama, Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachu- 
setts, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Vermont also recognized the wisdom of om- 
cia1 inspections. See Leverson, supra note 16, at 417-18. 
49. Id. at 418. 
50. Id. at 420. 
5 1. See PHILIP KLEIN, PRISON METHODS IN NEW YORK STATE 361 (1969). 
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the penitentiary than on rehabilitation. There was also wide- 
spread prison mismanagement and cruelty. Within a few years, 
several wardens in Auburn were forced to  resign because of 
their harsh treatment and neglect of their charges.52 The de- 
bate no longer centered upon whether incarceration would 
reform the inmate, but rather on the extent of prison cor- 
r ~ p t i o n . ~ ~  There began a self-perpetuating period of decline 
with a diminishing attraction for both systems. 
B. The Reformatory Movement-The Elmira Experiment 
By 1860, the penitentiaries had lost their rehabilitative 
purpose; nevertheless they still continued to be the principal 
means of criminal punishment. Where influential reformists 
had once marveled at the massive penitentiaries, those who 
now took their first look at these institutions were clearly dis- 
appointed. Two leading American penologists, E.C. Wines and 
Theodore Dwight, prepared a widely read report asserting that 
the prisons no longer made rehabilitation the central goal.54 
They declared that "there is not a state prison in America in 
which the reformation of the convicts is the one supreme object 
of the discipline, to  which everything else is made to bend.'"5 
These new reformists had little respect for the Pennsylvania 
and Auburn principles. As Wines and Dwight observed, conver- 
sations between inmates are beneficial since sociability is "a 
fountain of moral strength in civil life."56 They also criticized 
the rigidity of prison routine, observing that "what we want is 
to gain the will, the consent, the cooperation of these men, not 
to  mould them into so many pieces of ma~hinery."~' 
The new reformists wanted the convicts, with appropriate 
supervision, to reenter society as quickly as possible. They 
promulgated the original idea of the indeterminate sentence 
which, according to Wines, "gave to  the whole a wonderful 
vitality."58 They promoted, at fist ,  the commutation of sen- 
52. See w. DAVIS LEWIS, FROM NEWGATE TO DANNEMORA: THE RISE OF THE 
PENITENTIARY NEW YORK, 1796-1848, at 208-09 (1965); Leverson, supra note 16, 
at 426. 
53. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 242. 
54. ENOCH C. WINES & THEODORE W. DWIGHT, REPORT ON THE PRISONS AND 
REFORMATORIES OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 287 (1867). 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 179. 
57. Id. at 181. 
58. John P. Conrad, Correctional Treatment, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND 
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tence for good behavior, and then advocated probation and 
parole to further shorten the period of incarceration. Addition- 
ally, they urged the states to create agencies for the aftercare 
of released prisoners.59 Moreover, they demanded a separate 
institution for young first offenders and another for more dan- 
gerous criminals. Segregating the minority that caused the 
most trouble, they believed, provided greater flexibility in pris- 
on admini~tration.~~ 
Although these new views added substantially to the chsil- 
lusionment with the Auburn and Pennsylvania systems, Wines 
and Dwight never attracted a wide following. In 1877, however, 
they were able to initiate their progressive reforms at an insti- 
tution in Elmira, New York, but only for the treatment of 
young first offenders? Their theories were rarely introduced 
into the prisons which confined the older adult offenders and 
were therefore not applied to the mass of the country's prison 
p~pulat ion.~~ 
The Elmira Reformatory, like its predecessors, became 
world famous. Penologists from many countries came to study 
its methods and operation. These visitors no longer saw in- 
mates in striped uniforms, with shaven heads, moving in silent 
lockstep, as prevailed in other prisons at that time.63 The 
Elmira regimen was an active one. There were hours of mili- 
tary drill and dress parades. Vocational training and education- 
al programs, including moral and religious instruction, occu- 
pied the days of its  inmate^.^ 
The great advance of the reformatory system was that the 
term of incarceration now partially depended upon the 
prisoner's discernable progress toward reform. Its advocates 
stressed reformation rather than retribution. But the practice 
of good reformatory administration at that time required secure 
custody and permitted the superintendent wide discretionary 
JI.J~IC!E 270 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983). 
59. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 252. 
60. Id. 
61. See BARNES, supra note 2, at 167-68. . 
62. Id. at 168. "States were slow to establish parole and probation systems, and 
even less inclined to construct separate institutions for different offenders." 
ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 252. "Before the end of the century twelve states had 
built facilities on the Elmira model, and by 1933 there were eleven more." Conrad, 
supra note 58, at 270. 
63. LEWIS E. LAWES, TWENTY THOUSAND YEARS IN SING SING 35 (1932). 
64. See generally ZEBULON R. BROCKWAY, F I ~  YEARS OF PRISON SERVICE 
(1912). 
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powers, with no outside interference. The convict was to have 
no rights. His entire life was to be directed-all his waking 
hours, activities, and bodily and mental habits to be con- 
trolled.65 
While Elmira had the important elements of reform, it 
failed to provide the right sort of psychological surroundings to 
implement its objectives. There was no grasp of the fundamen- 
tal fact that a prisoner, to be prepared for a life of freedom, 
must be trained in some sort of social environment, which, as 
to his liberty and responsibility, has a fair resemblance to the 
society that he will reenter. There was no general recognition 
that the criminal must be dealt with as an  individual, to assist 
him to lead a good and useful life on discharge. There was no 
encouragement to develop restraint born of character and re- 
sponsibility. Basically, there was no attempt to develop in the 
prisoner a measure of self-development. 
Far from a vast improvement, the Elmira system "was 
repressive and varied from benevolent despotism in the best 
instances, to tyrannical cruelty in the It  was built on 
the same architectural principle as Auburn, but with "more 
drastic rules [for] punishment and ~bedience."~ Though nomi- 
nally a reformatory, in actuality i t  was a prison.68 At Elmira, 
the ages of admission ranged from 16 to 30, which prompted an  
English authority to remark that the trouble with the Reforma- 
tory idea was "that it made youths out of adults and adults out 
of youths, subjecting both to all the odious and cruel 
oppressions that prevailed in  prison^."^" 
Zebulon R. Brockway, a founder of the reformatory idea 
and the first superintendent of Elmira, ruled with an iron fist. 
He brought with him many of the features of adult prisons. 
Brockway's repressive administration led to many abuses, and 
when The New York World in 1900 published accounts of bru- 
tality within the Reformatory, he was forced to resiga7' 
Because of the above-mentioned failures, by the turn of the 
century, reformation no longer appeared to be the lodestar of 
incarceration. The new reformers were dissatisfied with peni- 
65. LAWES, supra note 63, at 37. 
66. BARNES, supra note 2, at 168. 
67. LAWES, supra note 63, at 37. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 36. 
70. Id. at 38. 
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tentiaries but had attracted little support to narrow the gap 
between society and the imprisoned. The massive, fortress-like 
penitentiaries were, after all, still ready to receive the next 
generation of convicts. The custodial nature of the penitentiary, 
as its sole benefit, appeared satisfactory to prison officials, 
state legislators, and the ordinary citizen.?' 
C. '!A Dark and Evil World"-The Arkansas Experience 
The reformists' dream of an enlightened era in prison 
treatment had failed to flower. By the early 1900s, the concept 
of reformation had practically disappeared and, for the most 
part, the penitentiary served a purely custodial function as a 
warehouse for the c~nvicted.?~ 
Historically, the judiciary played no role in supervising the 
conditions in the prisons or any of the procedures employed in 
its administration. A prisoner was conceived as "the slave of 
the State,"73 and the courts were reluctant to become im- 
mersed in prison operations. The universal wisdom was that 
the judiciary had no power to interfere with the jailer's discre- 
tion regarding the treatment and security of his  charge^.?^ 
"Hands-off' was the clear order of the time. With virtual 
unanimity, the courts decided that they neither had the power, 
nor was it their function, to supervise  prison^.?^ The "hands- 
off' doctrine was also supported by the legal theory distinguish- 
ing between rights and privilege~.~"ights, of course, were 
basic and afforded the utmost protection requiring judicial 
scrutiny. The courts, however, confirmed the warden's discre- 
tion to label various features of prison existence as privileges, 
which were simply grants from him that could be restricted or 
withdrawn at  will.?? By marking all forms of prison life as 
privileges, the warden denied the prisoner a judicial forum.78 
71. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 255. 
72. Id. 
73. Ruffm v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871). 
74. See generally Note, supra note 6. 
75. See, e.g., Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 US. 
859 (1954). 
76. See generally William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege 
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968). 
77. See, eg . ,  Parks v. Ciccone, 281 F. Supp. 805 (W.D. Mo. 1968) (use of 
typewriter); Childs v. Pegelow 321 F.2d 487 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 
932 (1964) (religious practices). 
78. A few &urts, however, departed from the "hands-off" doctrine and adopted 
a counterprinciple that "[a] prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen 
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However, in the late 1960s the "dark and evil world" of the 
penitentiary was finally exposed to a courageous federal dis- 
trict judge in Arkansas and subsequently to the nation.7g The 
Arkansas prisoners initiated an unprecedented judicial attack 
on the State's archaic penitentiary system. What Chief Judge 
Henley learned about the Cummins Farm Unit and the Tucker 
Reformatory was "completely alien to the free world."80 In- 
mates were tortured by electrical shocks and beaten with leath- 
er straps. Faced with the threat of death, they were forced to 
work ten hours a day, six days a week, sometimes in inclement 
weather and without adequate clothing. Trusty "inmate 
 guard^,"^' with the power over life and death, supervised the 
daily routine of the prison.82 Trying to escape forcible sexual 
violence and stabbings, the inmates in the barracks would 
"cling to the bars" all night.83 A sentence in the Arkansas pen- 
itentiary amounted to "banishment from civilized society" to  a 
damnable place.84 
Faced with these degrading conditions, Chief Judge Henley 
turned to the "cruel and unusual punishment" clause of the 
Eighth Amendment and found a constitutional violation in the 
climate of fear and hatred produced through the brutal and 
capricious exercise of power by the trusties. 
It  is one thing for the State to send a man to the Penitentiary 
as a punishment for crime. I t  is another thing for the State to 
delegate the governance of him to other convicts, and to do 
nothing meaningful for his safety, well being, and possible 
rehabilitation. . . . 
However constitutionally tolerable the Arkansas system 
except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him by law." Coffin 
v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944); see also Pierce v. La Vallee, 293 
F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961); Fulwood v. Clemmer, 295 F.2d 171 (D.C. Cir. 1961). 
79. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 381 (E.D. Ark. 1970), affd, 442 F.2d 304 
(8th Cir. 1971). For a graphic visual depiction of the Arkansas Penal System, see 
the movie BR~JBAKER (20th Century Fox 1980). 
80. Holt, 309 F. Supp. at 381. 
81. A trusty inmate guard is an inmate with administrative responsibilities. For 
a general discussion, see id. a t  373-76. 
82. "It is within the power of a trusty guard to murder another inmate with 
practical impunity, and the danger that such will be done is always clear and 
present." Id. at 374. 
83. Id. at 377. 
84. Id. at  381. Even today, remnants of the brutal power exercised by trusties 
and condoned by prison officials survive. See Ark Press, Inside America's Toughest 
Prison, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 6, 1986, at  46 (gripping story of the overcrowded condi- 
tions and brutal treatment of inmates in the Texas prison system). 
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may have been in former years, i t  simply will not do to- 
day . . . . 85 
Prior to the prison litigation, the people of Arkansas "knew 
little or nothing about their penal system" despite "sporadic 
and sensational 'exposes.' "86 The Arkansas experience became 
the new rallying point in prison reform. The myth that prison- 
ers were treated humanely could no longer be maintained. 
The Arkansas system proved to be neither an anachronism 
nor an aberration. Atrocities and mismanagement in other 
state prisons began to surface." The lid was off. Our highest 
Court had not as yet directly faced the prison problems being 
played out in the lower courts,8' but the time to do so was 
clearly a t  hand." 
A. Wolff v. McDo~ell-Development of Procedural 
Due Process in Correctional Facilities 
Discipline was regarded as the key to success in the Au- 
burn program. As the method to enforce discipline, the rule of 
85. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 381 (E.D. Ark. 1970), afd, 442 F.2d 304 
(8th Cir. 1971). 
86. Id. at  367. 
87. See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974); Ruiz v. Estelle, 
503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980), motion to stay granted in part, denied in part, 
650 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1981), afd in part, rev'd in part, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93 
(N.D. Ohio), supplemented by 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), afrd sub nom. 
Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972). See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 
337, 353 n.1 (1981) ( B r e ~ a n ,  J., concurring in the judgment), for a list of prison 
systems that had, by 1980, been declared unconstitutional under the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. 
88. While prisoners' rights litigation began to flourish in the lower courts, for 
the most part the Supreme Court, which under Chief Justice Warren's leadership 
had greatly expanded the rights of those accused of crime, basically ignored the 
next step: guarding the constitutional rights of those confined in prison. However, 
as the Court became more familiar with prisoners' claims, it prohibited the states 
from hindering prisoner access t o  the courts and thereby chipped away at  the 
"hands-off" doctrine. See, cg., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969). By the early 
1970s, the Court had reviewed several prison regulations that focused on the scope 
of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights in prison. See, e g . ,  Pell v. Procunier, 
417 U.S. 817 (1974); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405 
U.S. 319 (1972). 
89. See Hutto v. F i ~ e y ,  437 U.S. 678 (1978), where the Court affirmed the 
findings and remedial orders of the district court and Eighth Circuit in the Arkan- 
- sas prison decisions. 
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silence emerged as the most awesome feature of the penitentia- 
ry. After their tour through the Auburn prison, the French 
visitors Beaumont and Tocqueville wrote: "[Wle felt as if we 
traversed catacombs; there were a thousand living beings, and 
yet it was a desert solitude."g0 
The guards watching the movement of large numbers of 
inmates shuffling silently across the prison in lockstep could 
easily spot any unauthorized conversation or activity. For any 
infraction, the convict was swiftly punished. The whip was 
most common. Solitary confinement in a barren cell with one 
meal per day was soon introduced. Water "cures," stocks, and 
sweatboxes became widely used. These forms of punishment 
continued well into the middle 1 9 0 0 ~ . ~ ~  The wisdom of the 
time was that discipline was strictly a matter for prison admin- 
i s t r a t o r ~ . ~ ~  
Against this backdrop, in Wolf v. McDonnellg3 the Court 
took its first crucial step into modern-day prison reform. Wolf 
involved a prisoner's interest in maintaining the "good-time 
credit" he had accrued. As it examined a prison disciplinary 
proceeding that took place in a "closed, tightly controlled envi- 
r ~ n m e n t , " ~ ~  the Court sought to design a structure that would 
accord procedural due process to an  inmate. The Supreme 
Court forcibly declared that "a prisoner is not wholly stripped 
of constitutional protections when he is impr i~oned ."~~ There 
was to be "no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and 
the prisons of this ~ountry.'"~ The Wolff majority wisely pro- 
claimed that although confinement may diminish specific con- 
stitutional guarantees, including Fourteenth Amendment free- 
doms, "a mutual accommodation between institutional needs 
and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution" must be struckg7 
90. BEALJMONT & TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 37, at 65. 
91. AWICA, supra note 38, at 11. As the Arkansas experience demonstrated, 
brutality and torture by guards (and fellow prisoners) became commonplace in 
prison. See supra notes 79-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Ar- 
kansas experience. 
92. The Warren Court did little in this area. Two notable exceptions were 
Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (permitting inmates to use "jailhouse law- 
yers" when the state failed to provide adequate legal assistance), and Mempa v. 
Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (applying procedural due process requirements to the 
probation revocation process). 
93. 418 U.S. 539 (1974). 
94. Id. at 561. 
95. Id. at 555. 
96. Id. at 555-56. 
97. Id. at 556. 
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Wolff rejected the State's assertion that a prisoner's inter- 
est "in disciplinary procedures is not included in that 'liberty' 
protected" by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
A~nendment.~~ The State itself created the right t o  good-time 
credit toward early release fkom prison and recognized that its 
deprivation could only be sanctioned by major misconduct. The 
prisoner's interest, therefore, had real substance that suffi- 
ciently placed him within the pale of Fourteenth Amendment 
"liberty" and entitled him to minimum procedural due pro- 
cess." The Wolf Court believed that a person's "liberty" is 
equally protected when it is a statutory creation of the State, 
and under these circumstances, "[tlhe touchstone of due process 
is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of gov- 
ernment."' 
Prior to  Wolff, state prison officials were able t o  take away 
good-time credits after "serious misconduct" was shown in a 
nonadversarial hearing.lO' Wolf determined that before state 
prisoners could lose good-time credits, minimum procedural 
safeguards required that they receive "advance written notice 
of the claimed violation and a written statement of the 
factfinders as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for 
the disciplinary action taken."lo2 Furthermore, prisoners were 
permitted, when not unduly hazardous t o  institutional safety or 
goals, to  call witnesses and to present documentary evidence in 
their defense.lo3 
The "mutual accommodation" model did not, however, 
98. Id. at 556-57. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pro- 
vides that a State cannot "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law." U.S. C o ~ s r .  amend. XIV, $ 1. 
99. 418 US. at 557. 
100. Id. at 558. 
101. Id. at 546, 548-53 n.8. The prisoners in Wolff argued for the same 
protections required in parole and probation revocation hearings included in 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 
(1973). In Morrissty, the Court required that procedural safeguards at parole revo- 
cation include written notice of the alleged violations, disclosure of damaging evi- 
dence, an opportunity to be heard and "to present witnesses and documentary 
evidence," "the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses" (unless good 
cause for disallowing is shown), "a 'neutral and detached' hearing body," and "a 
written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for 
revoking parole." Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489. In Gagnon, the Court applied the 
Morrissg, standards to probation revocation hearings, and further held that due 
process requires the appointment of counsel for the hearings when it is fundamen- 
tally necessary. Cmgnon, 411 U.S. at 783-91. 
102. Wolff, 418 U.S. a t  563. 
103. Id. at 566. 
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include the rights to confrontation, cross-examination, o r  the 
appointment of counsel. These procedural rights were thought 
to present serious hazards to  institutional interests and were 
not perceived as requiring constitutional protection in the pris- 
on setting. The Court accepted the State's position that it 
would not be wise to encase disciplinary procedures in an "in- 
flexible constitutional straitjacket" that requires adversary 
proceedings typical of a criminal trial?" Doing so would very 
likely raise the confrontational level between the staff and 
their charges and undermine the "utilization of the disciplinary 
process as a tool to advance the rehabilitative goals of the insti- 
tution."lo5 The Court noted that as penal institutions change 
and correctional goals are altered, the balance of interests may 
be re~haped.'~"or now, when security dangers are involved, 
the better practice, "in a period where prison practices are di- 
verse and somewhat experimental, is to leave these matters to 
the sound discretion of the officials of state 
Wolf revealed that, in striking a "mutual accommodation," 
deference t o  the sound discretion of state officials was to play 
the decisive role.lo8 But by refusing t o  accept the established 
prison procedures, the Court discarded permanently the 
"hands-off' theory, inaugurating a new period in which the 
Court became a critical player. 
Wolf, however, was criticized as a glancing blow to the 
prison-rights movement. Of course, many prisoners "have [very] 
little regard for the safety of others" or the qegulations "de- 
signed to provide an orderly and reasonably safe prison [envi- 
r~nment ] . " '~~  But without the right to confront and 
cross-examine adverse witnesses, an inmate facing disciplinary 
proceedings was afforded little means to challenge the word of 
his accusers. lo The deference accorded prison officials ap- 
peared to leave the inmate no remedy against a board intent on 
104. Id. at 563. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 568. 
107. Id. at 569. Justice Marshall would have extended to prisoners those mini- 
mum requirements of due process required in parole revocation hearings as set out 
in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 US. 471, 489 (1972). These would include the right to 
call witnesses and present documentary evidence, as well as the right to confront 
and cross-examine adverse witnesses. WolK 418 U.S. at 581-82 (Marshall, J., con- 
curring in part and dissenting in part). 
108. 418 US. at 569. 
109. Id. at 562. 
110. Id. at 582 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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restricting rights in the name of "institutional safety.""' The 
right to call witnesses and present documentary evidence ap- 
peared unenforceable when left to the unchecked discretion of 
prison officials. 
Wolff had not considered the best way to accommodate the 
inmate's right to call witnesses. If the cbsciplinary board was 
required to provide on the record (not necessarily available to 
the inmate) a contemporaneous written explanation for exclu- 
sion of an inmate's witness, it would have gone far toward 
assuring the board's decision was based on permissible factors. 
But when faced with this option in Ponte v. Real," the Court 
once again opted for Wolfs vaguely defined "correctional goal" 
of "swift di~cipline.""~ The Court held that prison officials 
must explain their reason at some time, but "they may do so 
either by making the explanation a part of the 'administrative 
record' in the disciplinary proceeding, or by presenting testimo- 
ny in court."l14 By permitting a postponement of a reasonable 
explanation, Real left the inmates' constitutional rights to pres- 
ent evidence "dangling in the wind."l15 
Superintendent u. Hill""nally closed the door to disci- 
plinary procedural due process by declaring that if there is any 
evidence in the record that supports the conclusion reached by 
the disciplinary board, then the tribunal's decision is constitu- 
tionally acceptable.l17 Meeting this standard does not require 
an  examination of the entire record, independent assessment of 
the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence."' 
Perhaps, viewed from the inmate's eye, the one-sidedness 
of the disciplinary hearings becomes clearer. 
[Ilf I were to describe how they seem to a stranger, I would 
call them "pretend trialsy'-with the concept of "proving" guilt 
only make-believe. . . . [Tlhe process is not impartial, nor is 
guilt or innocence the issue. Guilt is an a priori assump- 
tion. "' 
Id. at 593 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part, concurring in the result in part). 
471 US. 491 (1985). 
Id. at 495. 
Id. at 497. 
Id. at 522 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
472 US. 445 (1985). 
Id. at 457. 
Id. at 455. 
KATHRYN W. BURKHART, WOMEN IN PRISON 147 (1973). 
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As one administrator bluntly put it: . . . 
"A woman can speak on her own behalf and try to con- 
vince us she's telling the truth, but we know what really hap- 
pened." 
Inmates say the process is one-sided from the get-go. . . . 
The woman is not allowed to call witnesses in her behalf. And 
the board is not required to give a decision based on evidence. 
"It's your word against hers," said one woman who had 
been in solitary confinement for a week when I met her. 
"She's always going to win because they're her people, they're 
going to listen to her. You're just a number or a blank space 
in their minds. You go in and sit in front of that board and 
you know you don't have a chance in heaven to get out of 
going to solitary."120 
Wolfs dissenters had not discounted the concerns prison 
officials had in maintaining prison security and understood 
that they were real and important; but they stressed that there 
was great danger in deferring to the "unreviewable discretion 
of prison a~thorities."'~~ As Justice Douglas vigorously in- 
sisted, regarding due process issues, the Court "should no more 
place the inmate's constitutional rights in the hands of the 
prison administration's discretion than . . . place the 
defendant's right in the hands of the prose~utor."'~ But, 
Wolf and its progeny may have done just that. 
B. From Meachum toHarper-Liberty Interest Originating 
in the Fourteenth Amendment 
The liberty interest protected by Wolf had its origins in 
state law. A prisoner's interest in maintaining his good-time 
credits had real substance and was thus sufficiently embraced 
within Fourteenth Amendment liberty. Wolf recognized that 
under these circumstances, minimum procedures were required 
by the Due Process Clause "to insure that the state-created 
right [was] not arbitrarily abr~gated."'~ 
Wolff tied its entitlement analysis to the state-created 
provisions, but implied that this was not essential to its hold- 
ing. Two years after Wolff was decided, the Court was asked to 
120. Id. at 147-48. 
121. Wolff v. M c D o ~ e l l ,  418 U.S. 539, 601 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting in 
part, concurring in the result in part). 
122. Id. at 600-01. 
123. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557. 
878 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I992 
determine whether its conception of liberty applied when the 
claimed right did not have its roots in state law. The key issue 
in Meachum v. FanolZ4 was whether a state prisoner could be 
transferred to a prison that is substantially more restrictive, 
absent a fact-finding hearing of alleged misc~nduct.'~~ At the 
outset, the Court rejected "the notion that any grievous loss 
visited upon a person by the State is sufficient to  invoke the 
procedural protections of the Due Process C l a u ~ e . " ' ~ ~ h e  
prisoner's conviction had sufficiently extinguished his liberty to 
permit the State to confine him in any of its prisons.127 The 
state law conferred no right on the prisoner to remain in the 
prison to which he was initially confined, and whatever expec- 
tation the prisoner may have had is "too ephemeral and insub- 
stantial to trigger procedural due process  protection^."'^^ In 
short, WoIfPs reasoning regarding hearings for good-time credit 
revocations and prison disciplinary confinement did not apply 
to prison transfers (even those sparked by alleged misconduct), 
and thus prison officials have unfettered discretion to transfer 
prisoners for any reason or for no reason at 
The net result of Meachum appeared to be that conviction 
and imprisonment extinguished a prisoner's liberty and that he 
could not gain any substantive protection from the bare word- 
ing of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. A clear 
signal was sent to the states that enabled them to forestall the 
development of liberty interests, at least when no state law or 
specific constitutional provision provided otherwise. As long as 
124. 427 U.S. 215 (1976). 
125. Id. at 216. The transfers occurred when, after a period of unrest at the 
Massachusetts Correctional Institution a t  Norfolk, several fires erupted that offi- 
cials suspected the inmates had set. The corrections authorities, after reviewing the 
classification board's recommendations, transferred six inmates to the Walpole and 
Bridgewater facilities where living conditions were "substantially more adverse" 
than at Norfolk. Fano v. Meachum, 387 F. Supp. 664, 665-67 (D. Mass.), affd, 520 
F.2d 374 (1st Cir. 1975), reu'd, 427 U.S. 215 (1976). 
126. 427 U.S. at 224. See Susan N. Herman, T h  New Liberty: The Procedural 
Due Process Rights of Prisoners and Others Under the Burger Court, 59 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 482 (1984), for a comprehensive study of the positivist theory of "property" 
and "liberty." 
127. 427 U.S. at 224. 
128. Id. at 228. 
129. Id. The Court distinguished Wotff in that "[tlhe liberty interest protected in 
Wolff had its roots in state law, and the minimum procedures required there were 
to protect a state-created right." Id. a t  226. In Meachum, "[tlhe predicate for invok- 
ing the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment as  construed and applied in Wolff 
v. M c D o ~ e l l  is totally nonexistent." Id. at 227. 
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the conditions of confinement were within the sentence im- 
posed and did not otherwise violate the Constitution, the Due 
Process Clause did not alone subject the prisoner's treatment 
by prison authorities to judicial oversight.lgO The Court re- 
fused to delineate a hierarchy of significant interests; rather its 
methodology was to closely examine the language of the rele- 
vant statutes and regulations t o  determine if there was a state- 
created substantive liberty interest.13' The State could create 
enforceable liberty interests in the prison setting " 'by placing 
substantive limitations on official discretion.' "13" Further- 
more, "the use of 'explicit mandatory language' " that establish- 
es "substantive predicates" to govern official decision making 
limits discretion and will force the Court to conclude that "the 
State ha[d] created a liberty interest."ls3 
Justice Stevens, dissenting in Meachun, was disturbed by 
the majority's pinched constitutional conception of liberty. To 
him, it was self-evident that the correct source of liberty pro- 
tected by the Constitution was the natural law, that all men 
are endowed by their creator with liberty as a cardinal, inalien- 
able right. It is this basic freedom which due process protects, 
rather than "particular rights or privileges conferred by specific 
laws or  regulation^."'^^ For Justice Stevens, it "demeans the 
concept of liberty itself-to ascribe to [it] nothing more than 
the protection of an interest that the State had created through 
its own [laws or] prison  regulation^."'^^ To him, it was clear 
that "the inmate retains an unalienable interest in liberty-at 
the very minimum the right to be treated with dignity-which 
the Constitution may never ignore."ls6 Trying to identify the 
residuum of liberty that the prisoner retained in the prison 
environment was understandably a difficult task. Justice 
Stevens was convinced, however, that at a minimum, an in- 
mate "has a protected right to pursue his limited rehabilitative 
130. Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976). 
131. In Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 459-63 (1989), 
Justice Blackmun summarized the Court's history of liberties protected by due 
process. See infra text accompanying notes 263-68 for a discussion of Thompson. 
132. Id. at 462 (quoting Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983)). 
133. Id. at 463 (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 470-72 (1983) (holding 
that a regulation that employed unmistakably mandatory language, such as "shall," 
"will," or "must," creates a protected liberty interest)). See infia note 140 for a 
discussion of Hewitt. 
134. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
135. Id. at 233. 
136. Id. 
880 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I992 
goals" and "to maintain whatever attributes of dignity" he can 
as an inmate in a "tightly controlled society."137 
The debate on whether prisoners have liberty interests 
beyond those based on state law occupied the Court as it 
sought to develop the implications of Mea~hurn . '~~  At times, 
some members of the Court tried to blur the bright line of 
M e a ~ h u m , ' ~ ~  only to subsequently have the Court reaffirm 
Meachum's theory. 140 
Finally, in Vitek v. Jones,l4l the Court gave the clearest 
evidence that it  would find substantive due process rights in 
the prison context apart from state-created rights. In Vitek, the 
Court left no doubt that a state prisoner does possess a signifi- 
cant Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in avoiding invol- 
untary transfer to a mental hospital. The stigma attached to a 
transfer to a mental hospital for involuntary psychiatric treat- 
ment, coupled with subjecting the inmate to "mandatory behav- 
ior modification as a treatment for mental illness," required 
137. Id. at 234. 
138. See Barry R. Bell, Note, Prisoners' Rights. Institutional Needs, and the Bur- 
ger Court, 72 VA. L. REV. 161, 171-81 (1986). 
139. See, e g . ,  Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981). 
Justice White, the author of the majority opinions in Wolff and Meachum, insisted 
that "neither Wolff . . . nor Meachum . . . suggested that state law is the only 
source of a prisoner's liberty worthy of federal constitutional protection." Id. a t  
467-68 (White, J., concurring). 
140. See, for example, Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983), where the Court 
continued the highly restrictive Meachum theory. 
The Court wrote that Helms "argues, rather weakly, that the Due Process 
Clause implicitly creates an interest in being confined to a general population cell, 
rather than the more austere and restrictive administrative segregation quarters." 
The Court concluded that "his argument seeks to draw from the Due Process 
Clause more than it can provide." Id. at 466-67. 
Hewitt involved the extended use of administrative segregation without obser- 
vance of the panoply of Wolfs procedural requirements. Helms, a state prisoner 
was thought to have participated in a riot and was confined to an administrative 
segregation unit, pending investigation into his role. The Court determined that 
"administrative segregation is the sort of confinement that inmates should reason- 
ably anticipate receiving at  some point in their incarceration." Id. a t  468. The 
Court characterized Helms's transfer as being merely "from one extremely restrict- 
ed environment to an even more confined situation," id. at 473, concluding that in 
order to confine to administrative segregation a prisoner feared to be a threat to 
institutional security, the only process due was "an informal nonadversary review 
of evidence." Id. at 474. 
The procedural safeguards of Wolff need not apply. Thus the Court permitted 
labels: disciplinary (Wolff) compared to classification (Meachum) and an administra- 
tive transfer (Hewitt) rather than substance and motivation to determine procedural 
rights. 
141. 445 U.S. 480 (1980). 
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procedural safeguards even greater than those required by 
Wolfs prison discipline analysis? A decade later, relying on 
Vitek, in Washington v. Harper,143 the Court again firmly ac- 
knowledged that a prisoner possesses a "significant liberty 
interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsy- 
chotic drugs."144 But the Court's treatment of retained rights 
has proved ephemeral. Vitek and Harper are the rare excep- 
t i o n ~ , ' ~ ~  as  the states' stronger claims have almost invariably 
outweighed the claimed liberty interest.146 
C. Specific Bill of Rights Provisions 
1. Pretrial detainees-Bell v. Wolfish 
In the restrictive atmosphere of prison, constitutional guar- 
antees that may be taken for granted in free society assume far 
greater importance. The opportunities to pursue religious be- 
liefs, to read a book, to write and receive a letter from a friend, 
or to have a family visit provide a vital link between the in- 
mate and the outside world. These simple acts nourish the 
prisoner's mind, provide a respite from "the blankness and 
bleakness of his environment," and help to cultivate rehabilita- 
tion, 14' 
Even before Wolfl, the Court had recognized fundamental 
142. Id. at 494. 
143. 494 US.  210 (1990). 
144. Id. a t  221-22. However, the Court held that, "given the requirements of the 
prison environment, the Due Process Clause permits the State to treat a prison 
inmate who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will, 
if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the 
inmates' medical interest." Id. at  227. Furthermore, the Special Offender Center's 
policy was "neither arbitrary nor erroneous" and satisfied the procedural protections 
required by the Due Process Clause. Id. at 228. This was so, even though the 
decision to medicate an inmate against his will was made at a hearing by medical 
professionals rather than a judge. Id. at 228-35. 
145. But see Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), where the Court recognized 
that the decision to marry is a constitutionally protected fundamental right even in 
the prison context. Id. at 96. Inmate marriages "are expressions of emotional sup- 
port and public commitment," have spiritual significance, are an exercise of reli- 
gious faith, and have an effect on the receipt of governmental benefits, property 
rights, and other less tangible benefits that are unaffected by the fact of confine- 
ment or legitimate corrections goals. Id. at  95-96. For a full discussion of % r e r ,  
see infra text accompanying notes 215-46. 
146. Justice Rehnquist cogently summarized this view, noting that "our decisions 
have consistently refused to recognize more than the most basic liberty interests in 
prisoners." Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983). 
147. See Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 129 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd sub nom. Bell 
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
882 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I992 
rights protected by specific Bill of Rights provisions. The Court 
required limited desegregation of prison inmates,148 guaran- 
teed the right to a reasonable opportunity t o  pursue religious 
faith,14' and limited the censorship of mail.150 Most impor- 
tantly, the states were required to  provide meaningful access to 
the  court^.'^' 
Wolf inaugurated the period in which the Court was t o  
take a more meaningful role in prison administration. Wolf 
itself dealt not merely with procedural due process in disciplin- 
ary hearings, but also with the claims that prison regulations 
infringed upon the prisoner's First and Sixth Amendment 
rights.lS:! The Court decided that the possibility that contra- 
band may be exchanged in letters, even from attorneys, war- 
ranted having prison officials inspect letters in an inmate's 
presence. '" 
As the Court took note of valid constitutional claims of 
prison inmates, it was also aware of the danger of meddling too 
extensively in the day-to-day administration of prisons. The 
problems of operating a correctional facility are enormous, and 
the Court believed it must give prison administrators 
wide-ranging deference in adapting and executing those policies 
needed to preserve internal order.15" Therefore, even when an 
institutional restriction infringed a specific constitutional guar- 
148. Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (ordering prison desegregation, 
while acknowledging that security needs might limit the extent of the decree). 
149. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). 
150. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974). 
151. Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1970), affd sub nom. Youn- 
ger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971) (constitutionally mandated law libraries or alter- 
native sources of legal knowledge); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (inmates 
may assist other inmates in preparation of petitions if no other reasonable alterna- 
tive provided); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941) (State may not abridge or im- 
pair a prisoner's right to apply to federal court for a writ of habeas corpus). The 
Gilmore theory was reaffirmed in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977), mak- 
ing i t  clear that the Constitution requires that prisoners have access to either 
"adequate law libraries" or to "adequate assistance from persons trained in the 
law" to aid them in pursuing claimed violations of fundamental constitutional 
rights in the courts. 
152. W O E  v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 574-77 (1974). 
153. Id. at  577. A lawyer desiring to correspond with a prisoner may also be 
required first to "identify himself and his client to the prison officials to assure 
that the letters marked privileged are actually from members of the bar." Id. at  
576-77. The state conceded that it "cannot open and mud mail from attorneys to 
inmates." Id. at 575. 
154. Id. at 566. 
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antee, the practice must be appraised in connection with the 
main purpose of prison administration-preserving institution- 
al safety.lss In Bell v. Wolfish,lS6 the Court concluded that  
pretrial detainees pose security risks similar to those of con- 
victed inmates,15' and, while prior decisions focused on con- 
victed inmates, the "principle of deference" was not dependent 
on this fact.ls8 
The specific conditions and restrictions challenged in Wolf- 
ish were "double bunking,"ls9 the enforcement of a 
"publisher-only" rule (prohibiting receipt of hard-cover books 
that were not mailed directly from the p~b l i she r ) , ' ~~  the pro- 
hibition against receipt of packages from outside the facility 
containing food o r  personal property,16' the "unannounced 
searches of inmate living areas at irregular intervals" ("shake- 
d o w n ~ " ) , ' ~ ~  and finally, visual body cavity searches after con- 
tact visits with persons from outside the institution. 
The Wolfish Court analyzed the special status of pretrial 
detainees, identifying a special Fourteenth Amendment right 
"not [to] be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accor- 
dance with due process of law."la The Court noted that "not 
every disability imposed during pretrial detention amounts to 
punishment in the constitutional sense."lB5 To ascertain 
whether it  was punishment, the subjective intent of prison of- 
ficials was decisive.lGG "Absent a showing of an expressed in- 
155. See Jones v. North Carolina hisonerd Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129 
(1977). 
156. 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
157. Id. at 546 n.28. 
158. Id. at 547 n.29. 
159. Id. at 530. 
160. Id. at 548-49. 
161. Id. at 553 (exception of one package of food at  Christmas). 
162. Id. at 555. 
163. Id. at 558. 
164. Id. at  535. 
165. Id. at 537. 
166. Id. at  537-38. The Court applied a punishment test established in Kennedy 
v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). 
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, 
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether i t  
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will 
promote the traditional aims of punishmenWretribution and deterrence), 
whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an 
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be c o ~ e c t e d  is assignable 
for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative pur- 
pose assigned are all relevant to the inquiry, and may often point in 
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tent to punish on the part of the detention facility," the deter- 
mination of whether the particular restriction amounts t o  pun- 
ishment turns on whether it is "reasonably related to a legiti- 
mate governmental objective" and not excessive in relation to  
that purpose.167 The Court declared that the government may 
lawfully incarcerate a suspected criminal before trial, and any 
restraints that reasonably relate t o  jail security "do not, with- 
out more, constitute unconstitutional punishment, even if they 
are discomf~rting."'~~ 
Applying this analysis, the Wolfish Court determined that 
the double-bunking practice did not violate the inmate's due 
process rights.16"'There was no 'one man, one cell' principle 
lurking in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend- 
ment"'" that would prohibit the placing of two detainees in 
an "admittedly rather small sleeping place" for a maximum 
period of sixty days. l7' 
To define the rights of pretrial detainees, Wolfish relied on 
principles the Court had established over the past decade to 
determine the constitutional restrictions of convicted persons. 
Although detainees are entitled at least to those retained con- 
stitutional rights of convicted persons, all restrictions, even 
those that impinge upon a specific constitutional guarantee, 
"must be evaluated in the light of the central objective of prison 
administration, safeguarding institutional ~ecurity."'~~ 
A detainee simply does not possess the full range of free- 
doms accorded to an unincarcerated individual. In balancing 
the competing interests, "[plrison administrators therefore 
should be accorded wide-ranging deference" not only for their 
expertise in running a corrections institution, but also because 
differing directions. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
167. Wolfish, 441 US. at 538-39. "Conversely, if a restriction or condition is not 
reasonably related to a legitimate goal-if it is arbitrary or purposeless-a court 
permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment 
that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua detainees." Id. at  539. 
168. Id. at 540. 
169. Id. at 541. 
170. Id. at  542. The federal government operated the detention facility in Wolf- 
ish: thus, the applicability of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. 
171. Id. at 543. The "detainees [were] required to spend only seven or eight 
hours each day in their rooms, during most or all of which they presumably 
[slept] . . . . During the remainder of the time, [they were] free to move between 
their rooms and the common area." Id. (footnote omitted). 
172. Id. at 547. 
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the operation of detention facilities "is peculiarly the province 
of the Legislative and Executive Branches of our Government, 
not the ~udicial."'~~ 
With this principle firmly established, the Court, on securi- 
ty grounds, upheld the regulations against all of the constitu- 
tional challenges. The "publisher-only" rule for hard-cover 
books did not violate the First Amendment since it reduced the 
chances that contraband would enter the prison. This "limited 
restriction [was] a rational response . . . to an obvious security 
problem."'74 Limitations on packages were held not to violate 
due process because of the administrative inconvenience of 
storing food and the serious security problems that arise fiom 
the introduction of such packages into the in~tituti0n.l~~ The
"shakedowny' searches in the absence of prisoners cld not vio- 
late the Fourth Amendment and were permitted as facilitating 
"the safe and effective performance of the ~ e a r c h . " ' ~ ~ i n a l l ~ ,  
the practice that instinctively gave the Court the most pause, 
the visual body cavity searches after contact visits,'77 was up- 
held as reasonable to deter the smuggling of weapons, drugs, 
and other contraband into the in~titution. '~~ 
2. Eighth Amendment-Cruel and Unusual Punishment- 
Rhodes v. Chapman 
The Wolfish Court agreed that the Due Process Clause was 
the primary source of protection for pretrial detainees. "Due 
173. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at  547, 548. 
174. Id. at 550. 
175. Id. at 553-55. 
176. Id. a t  557. The Court assumed, argzmzh, "that a pretrial detainee re- 
tain[ed] . . . a diminished expectation of privacy after commitment to a custodial 
facility." Id. Subsequently, in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984), the 
Supreme Court held that "a prisoner 'has no expectation of privacy in his prison 
cell entitling him to the protection of the Fourth Amendment." 
177. See infra notes 315-34 and accompanying text. 
178. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 558-59. Even though the district court noted that it 
would be virtually impossible for a prisoner wearing a jumpsuit zipped to the neck 
and under constant observation to hide items in a body cavity, United States ex 
rel. Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affd in part, rev'd and 
remanded in part sub nom. Wolfish v. Levi, 537 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd sub 
nom. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), the possibility that a prisoner might do 
so justified the practice. The Supreme Court observed that there had been only one 
instance where the inmate "was discovered attempting to smuggle contraband into 
the institution on his person," and credited this not to a lack of interest on the 
inmate's part to secrete such items but to the effectiveness of this practice as a 
search technique. 441 U.S. at 559. 
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process requires that a pretrial detainee not be p~nished."'~~ 
Once convicted, however, the State acquires the power to pun- 
ish "although the punishment may not be 'cruel and unusual' 
under the Eighth Amendment."'80 
The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clau~e,'~' like all 
the other great clauses of the Constitution, is not subject to 
easy resolution. But, framed in this clause are the values basic 
to a "civilized society." It is, therefore, not surprising that the 
lower federal courts, in the 1970s, first turned to this passage 
in the Constitution when faced with the degrading conditions of 
confinement in the Arkansas prison system.'" By 1981, fed- 
eral courts in at least twenty-four states had declared the con- 
ditions in certain prisons and, in some cases the entire prison 
system, unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. lS3 
Rhodes u. Chapman'" was the Supreme Court's first 
full-fledged consideration of Eighth Amendment claims by 
prison inmates. ls5 The Southern Ohio Correctional Facility 
(SOCF), a maximum-security prison, was a modern institution 
and "unquestionably a top-flight, first-class facility."''' " The 
food was 'adequate in every respect,'" "the noise in the cell- 
179. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979). 
180. Id. 
181. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. 
amend. VIII. 
182. The first prison litigation decision that enforced this provision was Holt v. 
Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), affd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971). In 
Holt, the district court found the Arkansas prison violated the Eighth Amendment 
rights of the prisoners confined there. See supra text accompanying notes 79-85 for 
a discussion of the Holt decisions. 
183. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 353 n.1 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring 
in the judgment). "There [were] over 8,000 pending cases filed by inmates challeng- 
ing prison conditions." Id. at 354 n.2. 
184. 452 U.S. 337 (1981). 
185. In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), the Supreme Court had held that 
the government must provide medical care to those whom it punishes by imprison- 
ment. "[Dleliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment." 
Id. a t  104 (citation omitted); see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986) (inflic- 
tion of pain in the course of security measures to resolve disturbance is an Eighth 
Amendment violation only if inflicted unnecessarily and wantonly); cf. Hutto v. 
F i ~ e y ,  437 U.S. 678 (1978) (ultimately affirming the findings and remedies of the 
Arkansas prison decisions, limiting the maximum period of punitive isolation to 30 
days). 
186. Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. 1007, 1009 (S.D. Ohio 1977), afd, 624 
F.2d 1099 (6th Cir. 1980), reu'd, 452 U.S. 337 (1981). 
8571 PRISON OBJECTIVES AND HUMAN DIGNITY 887 
blocks was not excessive," and the cells were free from odor 
with the temperature well controlled. 18' "In addition to 1,620 
cells, it ha[d] gymnasiums, workshops, schoolrooms, 'dayrooms ,' 
two chapels, a hospital ward, commissary, barbershop," outdoor 
recreation field, visitation area and garden, and a modern 
well-lit and superior library.'" Its only failing was the prac- 
tice of "double celling" prisoners because of overcr~wding,'~~ a 
practice the district court concluded was cruel and unusual 
punishment. lgO 
Applying general principles that the Eighth Amendment 
" 'must draw its meaning from . . . evolving standards of de- 
cency,' "lgl the Court noted that prison conditions must nei- 
ther inflict unnecessary and wanton pain "nor be grossly dis- 
proportionate to the severity of the crime warranting imprison- 
ment."'g"ut conditions that are not cruel and unusual 
under contemporary standards of decency are not unconstitu- 
tional. "To the extent that such conditions [may be] restrictive 
and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal 
offenders pay for their offenses against society."lg3 Double 
celling at SOCF "did not lead to deprivations of essential food, 
medical care, or sanitation. Nor did it increase violence among 
inmates . . . ."Ig4 Whatever cbscomfort it might have caused, 
it fell far short of violating the Constituti~n.'~~ 
The Court acknowledged that the judiciary had a "respon- 
sibility to scrutinize claims of cruel and unusual confine- 
ment."'" But, in discharging their responsibility, the "courts 
187. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 342 (quoting Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. a t  1019). 
188. Id. at 340-41. 
189. Id. at  343-44. Of prime concern to the district court was that the double 
celling was not a temporary condition, and that it was forced upon inmates serving 
long prison terms, who spent most of their time in the cell. Id. 
190. Id. at 343. The district court determined that each inmate should have a t  
least 50-55 square feet of space, but the double-celled inmates shared only 63 
square feet. The district court asserted double celling was a permanent practice a t  
SOCF and that prisoners who were double celled spent most of their time in the 
cell with their cellmates. The district court concluded that double celling at SOCF 
was cruel and unusual punishment. Id. a t  343-44. Only Justice Marshall agreed 
that confinement to this limited cell space qualified as "cruel and unusual punish- 
ment." Id. at  375 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
191. 452 U.S. at  346 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality 
opinion)). 
192. Id. at 346-47. 
193. Id. at 347. 
194. Id. at 348. 
195. Id. at 347-48. 
196. Id. at 352. 
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cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials are 
insensitive to the requirements of the Constit~tion."'~~ The 
Rhodes Court could not mask its disappointment in the lower 
courts, admonishing them to "bear in mind that their inquiries 
'spring from constitutional requirements and that judicial an- 
swers to them must reflect that fact rather than [their] idea of 
how best to operate a detention facility.""g8 The Court 
strongly cautioned lower federal court judges not t o  use the 
Eighth Amendment as a vehicle for prison reform. To insure 
compliance, the Court demanded deference to state legislatures 
and prison officials.199 
In Wilson v. Seiter?O0 the Court added to its Eighth 
Amendment analysis an additional element: an intent require- 
ment. The Wilson Court noted that Rhodes focused on the ob- 
jective component of an Eighth Amendment prison claim (that 
double celling was not sufficiently inhumane) and did not need 
to  consider the "subjective component (did the officials act with 
a sufficiently culpable state of mind?)."201 Since the infliction 
of punishment is a deliberate act intended to chastise or deter, 
Justice Scalia, for the Wilson majority, held that prisoners 
challenging the conditions of their confinement202 under the 
197. Id. Writing separately, Justice Blackmun perceived that some of Rhodes's 
language may be 
a signal to prison administrators that the federal courts now are to adopt 
a policy of general deference to such administrators and to state legisla- 
tures, deference not only for the purpose of determining contemporary 
standards of decency, but for the purpose of determining whether condi- 
tions at  a particular prison are cruel and unusual within the meaning of 
the Eighth Amendment. 
Id. at  369 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted). Noting 
that such deference was the old attitude held several decades ago, he agreed with 
Justice Brennan "that the federal courts must continue to  be available to those 
state inmates who sincerely claim that the conditions to which they are subjected 
are violative of the Amendment." Id. 
198. 452 U.S. at 351 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979)). 
199. Id. at 352. 
200. 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991). 
201. Id. at  2324. 
202. In Wilson, an Ohio prison inmate challenged a number of conditions of his 
confinement, including "overcrowding, excessive noise, insufficient locker storage 
space, inadequate heating and cooling, improper ventilation, . . . unsanitary dining 
facilities and food preparation," and the housing of well inmates with mentally and 
physically ill inmates. Id. at 2323. 
The Rhodes Court had observed that conditions of confinement, "alone or in 
combination, may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessi- 
ties." Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Justice B r e ~ a n  had viewed 
the Court as having adopted a "totality of the circumstances test." Id. at 363 n.10 
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Eighth Amendment must show "deliberate indifference" by the 
responsible officiaLm3 For Justice Scalia, this mandated an 
inquiry into the prison officials' state of mind. 
Wilson's intent requirement was not only a departure from 
Rhodes, but it may also prove difficult to apply.204 The judi- 
cial opinions detailing prison conditions do not make for pleas- 
ant reading.205 For example, the Alabama system was de- 
scribed by a U.S. health official as "wholly unfit for human 
habitation according to virtually every criterion used for evalu- 
ation by public health inspectors.'n06 The institutions were 
"horrendously overcrowded" and infested with roaches, flies, 
and other vermin. The food was "unappetizing and unwhole- 
some," poorly prepared, and "infested with insects." There was 
"rampant violence," where the weaker inmates were repeatedly 
victimized by the stronger inmates, and where "robbery, rape, 
extortion, theft and assault [were] everyday occurrences" 
among the general population.207 The Alabama experience 
was not an aberration, as similar tales of horror were recount- 
ed concerning other  institution^.'^^ 
( B r e ~ a n ,  J., concurring in the judgment). 
Justice Scalia explained that, in his view, Rhodes did not mean to establish 
such a broad proposition. For him, "[nlothing so amorphous as 'overall conditions' 
can rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment when no specific deprivation 
of a single human need exists." Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at  2327. He viewed Rhodes's 
combination language to require the conditions to have a "mutually enforcing effect 
that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food, 
warmth, or exercise-for example, a low cell temperature a t  night combined with a 
failure to issue blankets." Id. 
203. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2326-27. 
204. Id. at 2328-31 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). 
205. See, eg., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 354-56 (1981) (Brennan, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (describing the gruesome conditions in the Alabama 
penal system); supra text accompanying notes 79-85 (describing the Arkansas cor- 
rectional system). 
206. Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 323-24 W.D. Ala. 1976), afPd as modzfied 
sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part on other 
grounds sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (per curiam), and cert. denied 
sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 438 U.S. 915 (1978). 
207. Pugh, 406 F. Supp. a t  322-25. 
208. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 353 n.1 (1981) (Brennan, J., con- 
curring in the judgment); see also Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1391 (S.D. 
Tex. 1980). 
[Ilt is impossible for a written opinion to convey the pernicious conditions 
and the pain and degradation which ordinary inmates suffer within [un- 
constitutionally operated prisons]-the gruesome experiences of youthful 
first offenders forcibly raped; the cruel and justifiable fears of inmates, 
wondering when they will be called upon to defend the next violent as- 
sault; the sheer misery, the discomfort, the wholesale loss of privacy for 
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To permit prison officials to "interpose [as their] defense 
that they made good faith efforts to obtain funding," but that 
"fiscal constraints beyond their control prevented the elimina- 
tion of inhumane conditions,"209 would be to ignore serious 
deprivations of basic human needs.210 These conditions are 
the consequence of the cumulative actions by state legislative 
bodies and prison administrations over a long period of 
time.211 A reasonably safe and sanitary environment, free 
from conditions which inexorably and unnecessarily cause 
physical and mental deterioration, should be the Court's goal. 
Confinement with dignity should be society's hallmark. 
IV. THE NEWLY MINTED STANDARD 
A. Turner v. Safley-A Crushing Blow To Prisoners' Rights 
By the mid-1980s' the Supreme Court was firmly en- 
meshed in prison litigation. WolfP12 and wolfish213 played a 
critical role in shaping the Court's theories. Wolff catered to 
deference but still counseled a reasonable accommodation. 
Wolfish turned to the historical role of the judiciary in penal 
reform and mandated a position of even greater deference to 
the judgment of prison  administrator^.^'^ 
prisoners housed with one, two, or three others in a forty-five foot cell or 
suffocatingly packed together in a crowded dormitory; the physical suffer- 
ing and wretched psychological stress which must be endured by those 
sick or injured who cannot obtain adequate medical care . . . . 
For those who are incarcerated within [such prisons], these conditions 
and experiences form the content and essence of daily existence. 
Rhodm, 452 U.S. a t  353 n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
209. Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2326 (1991). Justice Scalia would appar- 
ently accept this defense. He noted that even if this were so, "it is hard to under- 
stand how it could control the meaning of 'cruel and unusual punishment' in the 
Eighth Amendment. An intent requirement is either implicit in the word 
'punishment' or it is not; it cannot be alternately required and ignored as policy 
considerations might dictate." Id. 
210. A rare alliance was forged in Wilson when the Justice Department joined 
the American Civil Liberties Union in urging rejection of intent. As argued by the 
United States: "[S]eriously inhumane, pervasive conditions should not be insulated 
from constitutional challenge because the officials managing the institution have 
exhibited a conscientious concern for ameliorating its problems, and have made 
efforts (albeit unsuccess~l) to that end." Id. at 2331 (White, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (citing brief for the United States as amicus curie at 19). 
211. Id. at 2330. 
212. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). 
213. Bell v. WoKish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
214. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at  540-41 11.23 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 
827 (1974)). The Court repeated this admonition a second time. Id. at  547 11.29. 
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As the Court began to translate the proper posture of def- 
erence into meaningful practices, there was still much disagree- 
ment as to the appropriate standard to apply when prison 
regulations impinged on fundamental constitutional rights. In 
Turner u. Safley?l5 the Court provided the solid guidance 
needed for determining whether regulations promulgated by 
prison administrators run afoul of constitutional rights re- 
tained by prisoners. 
The inmates in Turner challenged two prison regulations. 
The first regulation permitted correspondence between "imme- 
diate family members who [were] inmates in other correctional 
institutions," and between inmates "concerning legal matters," 
but did not allow other inmate-to-inmate correspondence unless 
the "treatment team" of each inmate approved.216 In practice, 
the effect of this regulation completely prohibited correspon- 
dence between unrelated inmates.217 The second regulation 
permitted prisoners to marry other inmates or civilians only 
with the permission of the prison ~uperintendent.~" Permis- 
sion was to be given only where there were "compelling rea- 
sons" for the marriage-interpreted by prison officials as "preg- 
nancy or the birth of an illegitimate 
The Court acknowledged that its task was "to formulate a 
standard of review for prisoners7 constitutional claims that 
[was] responsive both to the 'policy of judicial restraint regard- 
ing prisoner complaints and [to] the need to protect constitu- 
tional rights.' 7'2Z0 The court of appeals had affirmed the dis- 
trict court's application of a "strict scrutiny standard,"221 rea- 
soning that this standard was appropriate since both regula- 
tions prohibited the exercise of fundamental  right^.'^ But 
Justice O'Connor (writing for the majority) disagreed, and, 
after reviewing some of the Court's more recent prisoners' 
rights decisions, found in those decisions the makings of a 
general standard. In none of these cases had the Court applied 
215. 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
216. Id. at 81-82. 
217. Id. at 82. "[Tlhe determination whether to permit inmates to correspond 
was based on team members' familiarity with the progress reports, conduct viola- 
tions, and psychological reports in the inmates' files rather than on individual 
review of each piece of mail." Id. 
218. Id. 
219. Id. 
220. Id. at 85 (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 406 (1974)). 
221. Id. at 83. 
222. Id. at 87. 
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a standard of "heightened scrutiny." Rather, the Court had 
inquired "whether a prison regulation that burdens fundamen- 
tal rights is 'reasonably related' to legitimate penological objec- 
tives, or whether it represents an 'exaggerated response' to 
those concerns."223 
Applying an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis to the 
day-to-day judgments of prison officials, O'Connor reasoned, 
"would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security 
problems and to adopt innovative solutions" to difficult admin- 
istrative problems. Furthermore, a strict scrutiny rule would 
"distort the decisionmaking process," inevitably making the 
courts the final arbiter of "what constitutes the best solu- 
thereby " 'unnecessarily perpetuat[ing] the involve- 
ment of the federal courts in affairs of prison administra- 
tion.' "225 
Justice O'Connor outlined four factors relevant to her "rea- 
sonableness" analysis. First is a " 'valid, rational connection' 
between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental 
interest put forward to  justify it."226 The goal must be a legit- 
imately neutral one and the logical connection between it and 
the regulation not so remote as to  render it "arbitrary or irra- 
t i ~ n a l . " ~ ~ ~  
The second consideration is the availability of other means 
by which the prisoner could exercise the right2" Where "oth- 
er avenues" remain available, she cautioned that "the courts 
should be particularly conscious of the 'measure of judicial 
deference' " to be accorded to the professional judgment of pris- 
on officials.229 
The third consideration is the impact that granting a cer- 
tain right will have on the guards and other inmates.230 Rec- 
ognizing that "few changes will have no ramifications on the 
liberty of others or on the use of the prison's limited resources 
for preserving institutional order,"231 deference to the "in- 
formed discretion of corrections officials" is necessary, especial- 
223. 482 U.S. at 87. 
224. Id. at 89. 
225. Id. (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 US. 396, 407 (1974)). 
226. Id. (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)). 
227. Id. at 89-90. 
228. Id. at 90. 
229. Id. (quoting Pel1 v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)). 
230. Id. 
231. Id. 
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ly when accommodating the asserted right "will have a signifi- 
cant 'ripple effect' on fellow inmates or on prison staff"232 
Finally, if the prisoner has "an alternative that fully ac- 
commodates [his] rights, at de minimis cost to valid penological 
interests," such an alternative is evidence a court may consider 
in determining whether "the regulation does not satisfy the 
reasonable relationship standard."233 Justice O'Connor 
warned that this last factor "is not a 'least restrictive alterna- 
tive' test" but, "[bly the same token, the existence of obvious, 
easy alternatives [is] evidence that the regulation" may be un- 
reasonable and "an 'exaggerated response' to prison con- 
c e r n ~ . " ~ ~ ~  
Addressing the new standard, Justice O'Comor credited 
the prison officials' testimony that "mail between institutions 
can be used to communicate escape plans and to arrange as- 
saults and other violent acts" and to facilitate prison gang 
activities.235 Applying her analysis to the record "clearly dem- 
onstrat[ed] that the regulation was reasonably related to legiti- 
mate security  interest^."^^ Moreover, the regulation did not 
"deprive prisoners of all means of expression," but merely 
barred communication with a limited class of persons (inmates 
of other state institutions) "with whom prison officials have 
particular cause to be ~oncerned."~~' 
The potential "ripple effect" on other inmates and prison 
personnel is great. Accepting the prison officials' professional 
judgment that  "correspondence between [prisons] facilitates the 
development of informal organizations that threaten . . . safety 
and internal security,"2s8 Justice O'Connor believed that the 
asserted correspondence right could "be exercised only a t  the 
cost of signXcantly less liberty and safety for everyone 
Justice O'Connor determined that there were no "obvious, 
easy alternatives'' to the existing regulations, rejecting as inad- 
equate and overly burdensome the prisoners' sole proposal of 
232. 482 U.S. at 90. 
233. Id. at 91. 
234. Id. at 90. 
235. Id. at 91. 
236. Id. 
237. Id. at 92. 
238. Id. 
239. Id. 
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monitoring the cor resp~ndence .~~~ She agreed with the prison 
officials that i t  would be impossible for the mailroom "to read 
every piece of inmate-to-inmate correspondence," and conse- 
quently, there was an "appreciable risk of missing dangerous 
messages." "In any event, prisoners could easily write in jargon 
or codes to prevent detection of their real messages."241 
Justice O'Comor concluded that the "prohibition on corre- 
spondence [was] reasonably related to valid corrections goals" 
(institutional security), was not an exaggerated response to this 
concern, and therefore did not unconstitutionally abridge the 
prisoner's First Amendment rights.242 
The rule allowing inmate marriages only with permission 
of the prison superintendent did not, however, pass the reason- 
able relationship standard. Recognizing the decision to marry 
as a fundamental right, Justice O'Connor characterized the 
regulation as an "exaggerated response" to the security and 
rehabilitative objectives of the State.243 She noted that there 
were "obvious, easy alternatives" readily available to prison 
officials to accommodate the right to marry that imposed a 
minimal burden on security? 
The "newly minted"u5 standard announced in Turner, of 
course, was hardly new, since O'Comor drew upon previous 
decisions in identifying the several factors relevant to a rea- 
sonableness d e t e r m i n a t i ~ n . ~ ~ ~  Justice O'Connor had merely 
240. 482 U.S. at 93. 
241. Id. 
242. Id. 
243. Id. at  97-98. The security justification advanced by prison officials concerned 
the possibilities of violent "love triangles" leading to confrontation between inmates. 
Id. at  97. Justice O ' C o ~ o r  summarily rejected this, reasoning that such inmate 
rivalries were just as likely to occur without a formal marriage ceremony. Id. at  
98. 
Secondly, the prison administration asserted a rehabilitative theory, encouraging 
self-reliance among female inmates abused at  home or who exhibited a detrimental 
overdependence on males. Id. at  97. Superintendent Turner testified that "in his 
view, these women [inmates] needed to concentrate on developing skills of 
self-reliance," and "that the prohibition on marriage furthered this rehabilitative 
goal." Id. Justice O'Connor found the asserted rehabilitative objective "suspect," as 
only one marriage request was refused on the basis of fostering excessive depen- 
dency; and excessively paternalistic, as all female requests were scrutinized careful- 
ly while males were routinely approved. Id. at 99. Furthermore, the "rehabilitation 
concern [in the record] centered almost exclusively on female inmates marrying 
other inmates or ex-felons," and this "does not account for the ban on 
inmate-civilian marriages." Id. 
244. Id. at 98. 
245. Id. at 101 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
246. The elements of reasonableness in llmzer are similar to those factors that 
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supplemented her "reasonable relationship" analysis by ex- 
panding upon additional factors that should be considered in 
evaluating the challenged prison regulation. The decision's 
basic framework contained many of the same considerations 
that had constituted the unique components of the Court's prior 
analysis. 
More importantly, the Court once again emphasized "defer- 
ence" over "rights." The Court's challenge was how t o  best pro- 
tect those precious few prisoners' rights that remained while 
accommodating institutional needs. Turner refused to break the 
pattern: "categorical deference" was once again the order of the 
day. 
B. Turner's Progeny-The Knockout Punch 
Turner framed the standard of review, delineating the 
boundaries within which the debate over prisoners' rights must 
take place. The Court's values and motives were clearly enunci- 
ated, its language a clear signal to prison administrators that 
categorical deference to  their judgment was to continue as a 
policy of the Rehnquist Court.247 Rapidly, the Court disman- 
tled other potential "prisoners' rights." 
One week after deciding Turner, the Court applied its stan- 
dard to policies adopted by state correctional officials that effec- 
tively prevented Muslim inmates, who were assigned to outside 
work crews, from attending Jumu'ah, the central weekly reli- 
gious service of their faith. In O'Lone v. Estate of Shabaz~?~' 
Muslim inmates challenged prison policies aimed at relieving 
service overcrowding, but which had the incidental effect of 
preventing them fiom attending Jumu'ah. Si&icant security 
problems arose with Muslims assigned to outside work details. 
As their return posed unacceptable security risks and adminis- 
trative burdens, a new policy memorandum "prohibited in- 
the Court had developed in prior decisions. Justice O'Connor specifically cited prior 
prisoners' rights cases as the origins of the factors she developed in her analyses. 
Turner, 482 US. at  89-90 (citing Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984); Bell v. 
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 
433 U.S. 119 (1977); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974)). Justice O'Connor 
stated that Pell, Jones, and Bell had probably already determined the proper stan- 
dard for review. Id. at 89. But if not, she resolved it: "[Wlhen a prison regulation 
impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably 
related to legitimate penological interests." Id. 
247. See l h m r ,  482 US. at 85. 
248. 482 U.S. 342 (1987). 
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mates . . . from returning to the prison during the day except 
in the case of emergency."249 
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, determined that the court of appeals was clearly 
wrong when it required the state to show that i t  had made a 
bona fide inquiry into whether reasonable methods existed by 
which the prisoners' religious rights could be accommodated 
without creating security problems.250 The court of appeals 
believed that 
[wlhere it is found that reasonable methods of accommodation 
can be adopted without sacrificing either the state's interest 
in security or the prisoners' interest in freely exercising their 
religious rights, the state's refusal to allow the observance of 
a central religious practice cannot be justified and violates the 
prisoners' First Amendment rightsSZ5l 
But the Chief Justice firmly declared that this articulated ap- 
proach had failed "to reflect the respect and deference that the 
United States constitution allows for the judgment of prison 
ad~ninistrators."~~~ Although mutual accommodation is rele- 
vant to the reasonableness inquiry, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
reasoned that prison administrators do not "'have to set up 
and then shoot down every conceivable method of accommodat- 
ing the [prisoners'] constitutional' " rights? 
Applying the new Turner standards, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist found beyond doubt that the new policy was related 
to legitimate security concerns.254 Furthermore, the Muslim 
inmates' ability "to participate in other religious observances of 
their faith" gave added credence to the determination that the 
restrictions were reasonable.255 Finally, the inmates' suggest- 
ed accommodations256 would "threaten prison security by al- 
lowing 'affinity groups' in the prison to flourish" and create a 
perception of favoritism toward the ~ u s l i m s . ~ ~ '  The Chief 
249. Id. at 347. 
250. Id. at 350. 
251. Shabazz v. O'Lone, 782 F.2d 416, 420 (3d Cir.), stay denied sub mm. 
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 478 U.S. 1033 (1986), and reu'd, 482 U.S. 342 (1987). 
252. O'Lom, 482 U.S. at 350. 
253. Id. (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90-91 (1987)). 
254. Id. at 351. 
255. Id. at 352. 
256. The inmates suggested "placing all Muslim inmates in one or two inside 
work details or providing weekend labor for Muslim inmates." Id. 
257. Id. at 353. 
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Justice concluded by redfirming the Court's refusal, "even 
where claims are made under the First Amendment" Free Ex- 
ercise Clause, "to 'substitute [its] judgment on . . . difficult and 
sensitive matters of institutional administration' " for the pris- 
on administrators' determination.258 
Deference had assumed a new constitutional prominence in 
prison decisions. Incoming publications would now be constitu- 
tionally rejected if prison officials found their contents were 
" 'detrimental to . . . security, good order, or discipline"' or 
" 'might facilitate criminal activity.' "259 This time, despite the 
apparent vagueness of the terms used in the regulations, Jus- 
tice Blackmun, writing for the majority in Thornburgh u. 
A b b ~ t t , ~ ~ '  declared the terms facially valid in order to give 
prison authorities broad discretion.261 The warden had once 
again achieved free reign to censor what the prisoners 
read.262 
In Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson,263 
Justice Blackmun, once again writing for the majority, gave 
correctional officials unbridled authority over the "basic human 
need" of the prisoner to see family and friends2* In Thomp- 
son, Justice Blackmun questioned whether it could "seriously 
be contended . . . that an inmate's interest in unfettered visita- 
tion is guaranteed directly by the Due Process Clause."265 
Finding that the "denial of prison access to a particular visitor" 
was " 'within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated 
by a prison sentence,' " the Court determined that access was 
258. Id. (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 588 (1984)). 
259. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 404 (1989) (quoting 28 C.F.R. 
g 540.71(b) (1988)). 
260. 490 U.S. 401 (1989). 
261. Id. at 419. The regulations authorize rejection of the entire publication, 
even if just one page presents an intolerable security risk. Id. at  431 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The primary justification advanced for 
the rule was administrative convenience. A contrary rule would require "1aborious1y 
going over each article in each publication" and defacing the material. Id. at  432- 
33. 
Justice Stevens criticized the "meat-ax" abridgment of the First Amendment 
rights on the general speculation that some administrative burden might ensue. Id. 
Moreover, he found it difficult to imagine such a burden "if, as the regulations' 
text seems to require, prison officials actually read an article before rejecting it, 
the incremental burden associated with clipping out the offending matter could not 
be of constitutional significance." Id. 
262. 490 U.S. at 428 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
263. 490 US. 454 (1989). 
264. Id. at 465-66 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
265. Thompson, 490 U.S. at 460. 
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not independently protected by the Due Process Clause? 
Furthermore, the state regulations lacked the requisite "man- 
datory language" to establish a "liberty interest" entitled to the 
protections of the Due Process Clause.267 After Thompson, the 
warden was free to deny prisoners visits from family members 
or friends without stating a reason; hence, there were practical- 
ly no  constraint^.^" 
Turner, Ozone, Abbott, and Thompson clearly demonstrat- 
ed how feeble any protection would be under Wolfs call for a 
"reasonable accommodation." In less than two years, the Court 
had, under the warden's waving of the security flag, severely 
limited the inmates' First Amendment rights and placed within 
the warden's unchecked discretion the most "basic human 
need" of an inmate to see his family. The warden, with the 
Court's blessing, was now firmly the master a t  the helm. Defer- 
ence had become the substitute shibboleth for "hands-off." The 
chance of reaching any meaningful "mutual accommodation" 
appeared slim. 
V. A CRITICISM OF THE DEFERENCE MODEL 
Prisoners are politically powerless to change their condi- 
tions. They are voteless and socially threatening. As crime 
rates have increased, public apathy has contributed to the neg- 
ative attitude of politicians and prison officials toward any 
substantial reform. I t  is generally accepted that prisoners, iso- 
lated fiom public view and regarded with disgust by the politic, 
are receiving their "just deserts." Against this background, the 
lower federal courts emerged as the critical force able to ame- 
liorate inhumane conditions during the 1970s and 1 9 8 0 s . ~ ~ ~  
But deference has assumed the prominent position in pris- 
on litigation. The likelihood of achieving any meaningful "mu- 
tual accommodation" is minimal as long as the Supreme Court 
continues to categorically yield to the .prison authority's own 
assessment of its security needs. By readjusting the scales in 
266. Id. at 461 (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983)). 
267. Id. at 464-65. 
268. But compare Justice Kennedy's concurrence: "Nothing in the Court's opinion 
forecloses the claim that a prison regulation permanently forbidding all visits to 
some or all prisoners implicates the protections of the Due Process Clause in a 
way that the precise and individualized restrictions at issue here do not." Id. at 
465 ( K e ~ e d y ,  J., concurring). 
269. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 359 (1981) ( B r e ~ a n ,  J., concurring in 
the judgment). 
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the deference direction, respect for any residual rights that 
may have been retained by prisoners has been restricted or 
simply eliminated. The Court's continual capricious invocation 
of the deference model runs the risk of returning prisons to the 
past when prevailing conditions of "barbarism and squalor . . . 
were met with a judicial blind eye and a 'hands off ap- 
p r o a ~ h . " ~ ~ ~  
A. Judicial Restraint-Administrative Expertise 
Prison litigation marks an important accommodation be- 
tween courts and other branches of government, in particular 
between the federal courts and state institutions. It is exempla- 
ry not merely because of its complexity, but because of the de- 
gree of judicial intrusion. To some commentators, the prison 
cases evidence "judicial a~tivism.'~~' This label may suggest 
that courts are acting in a field more properly within the execu- 
tive and legislative spheres of influence. Intimately connected 
to this theme is the idea that the courts must be wary of violat- 
ing traditional separation of powers principles. A fundamental 
precept of this commentary is that when the court orders an 
institutional remedy, even if it does not cross a well-defined le- 
gal line, it steps too close to the boundaries of other. branches of 
government. 
A closely connected motif concerns the courts performing 
administrative and supervisory tasks with which they have 
little familiarity and too few qualifications. Without statutory 
authority, these burdens are seen as the sole responsibility of 
prison authorities. 
And, of course, there should be sensitivity to  federalism 
concerns whenever a federal court makes intrusive orders regu- 
lating state institutions. Overriding the entire debate is the 
question of judicial authority to allocate public funds to effect 
its orders.272 The necessary funds, if available at all, are gen- 
270. Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 594 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring in 
the judgment). 
271. For a general discussion on judicial activism, see Abram Chayes, The Role 
of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV.'L. REV. 1281 (1976); Archibald 
Cox, The New Dimensions of ConstitutiC%il Adjudication, 51 WASH. L. REV. 791 
(1976); Robert D. Goldstein, A Swam Song for Remedies: Equitable Rdief in  the 
Burger Court, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1978). 
272. Federal Judge Anthony A. Alaimo ordered the Georgia Corrections Depart- 
ment to spend $60.2 million Wo improve, modernize and expand" the Georgia State 
Prison in Reidsville and to "replace its dangerous overcrowded open dormitories 
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erally thought t o  be weighed and allocated by the legislative 
and executive branches of government. 
When the Supreme Court counsels judicial restraint, it has 
in mind the panoply of these commentaries. But these observa- 
tions deserve far more discussion because they represent fun- 
damental choices respecting constitutional rights and remedies, 
preferences that should not be made by sparring over the ap- 
propriate role of federal courts.273 
Probably the most misplaced practice is that of accorhng 
judicial deference to administrative expertise. The care and 
custody of prisoners are relegated to correctional agencies 
which are chronically understaffed and ill-trained.274 Prison 
administrators relinquish supervisory control t o  guards who 
deal with inmates intimately on a daily basis. As a result, sub- 
ordinate custodial personnel, often undereducated and under- 
trained, exercise independent and sometimes capricious discre- 
tion in meting out severe disciplinary sanctions. As noted by 
two commentators active in prison litigation: 
Prisoners often have their privileges revoked, are denied the 
right of access to counsel, sit in solitary or maximum security 
or lose accrued "good time" on the basis of a single, unre- 
viewed report of a guard. When the courts defer to adminis- 
trative discretion, i t  is this guard to whom they delegate the 
final word on reasonable prison practices. This is the central 
evil in prison. It is not homosexuality, nor inadequate sala- 
ries, nor the cruelty and physical brutality of some of the 
guards. The central evil is the unreviewed administrative 
discretion granted to the poorly trained personnel who deal 
directly with prisoners.275 
Of course, the evaluation of penological objectives has, in 
the first instance, been trusted to the wise judgment of prison 
with single cells." Jingle Davis, Judge Pays Surprise Visit to Prison, and Is 
Pleased, ATLANTA J. & CONST., June 19, 1990, at Dl, D6. 
273. Problems of judicial intrusion into the operations of large public institutions 
are shared by other forms of institutional litigation, especially school desegregation 
and mental health. See Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary 
and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HAW. L. REV. 465 (1980). 
274. TASK FORCE ON CORRECTIONS, PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AND ADMIN. OF JIJSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORREC~TIONS 93-99 (1967). 
275. Philip J. Hirschkop & Michael A. Millemann, The Unconstitutionality of 
Prison Life, 55 VA. L. REV. 795, 811-12 (1969). See supra text accompanying note 
120 for a prisoner's account that exemplifies the capricious nature of disciplinary 
hearings. 
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administrators "who are actually charged with and trained in 
the running of the particular institution under examina- 
t i ~ n . " ~ ~ ~  But the judiciary functions as the final arbiter. When 
it fails to review and correct prison conditions, it legitimizes 
the status quo and encourages abuse.277 
B. Judicial Restraint-Separation of Powers and Federalism 
The Court has felt it important to respect the judgment of 
prison officials. The Court is not only influenced by prison 
officials' expertise, but also by the fear that serious separation 
of powers issues would arise if the judiciary attempted to run 
the  prison^.^" Are courts displacing executive and legislative 
power in a way that violates separation of powers? Prison liti- 
gation arises not so much because of a conflict of power, but 
because the courts are asked t o  fill a vacuum created by the 
other branches of government. Judicial authority in prison lit- 
igation may be attributed to legislative inaction and executive 
neglect. Only after it became clear that no relief would be vol- 
untarily forthcoming were the courts dragged into prison re- 
The story of Holt v. S a r ~ e r , ~ ~ ~  the federal courts' first se- 
rious foray into state prisons, is representative of federal reluc- 
tance to intrude upon the states' legislative and executive pre- 
rogatives. Although the court found that the conditions at the 
Arkansas prison were degrading, disgusting, and inhumane, for 
many months the federal court left the remedies to state au- 
thorities. Only afker it was apparent that Arkansas was not 
about to clean its own house did the court begin to issue de- 
tailed decrees. The federal court in Holt 11 expressed respect for 
Arkansas prerogatives and simply ordered officials "to make a 
prompt and reasonable start toward eliminating" the unconsti- 
tutional  condition^.^^' Even after a passage of three years, 
the court of appeals held that Arkansas had not yet provided a 
constitutional environment within the prisons.282 
276. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979). 
277. See Hirschkop & Mil lerna~,  supra note 275, at 835-37. 
278. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 548 (1979). 
279. See Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 273, at 495-96. 
280. 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969) (Holt 1); 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 
1970), afd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971) (Holt 10. 
281. 309 F. Supp. at 383. 
282. F i ~ e y  v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 200 (8th Cir. 1974). 
The district court in Holt v. Hutto noted with approval the changing attitudes and 
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Certainly, courts should hesitate before becoming involved 
in continuous litigation and supervision of unfamiliar institu- 
tions, but the Constitution does not command that executive 
and legislative officials be the sole or even final judges of pris- 
on conditions.283 When the prisoners are totally dependent on 
the government, some branch must be responsive to their 
needs. 
The existence of judicial authority to allocate public funds 
raises special concerns. Judges demanding improvement of 
prison facilities have been criticized as intruding into the do- 
main of the legislature, whose province it is to determine the 
appropriate allocation of limited resources. Criticism of judicial 
meddling reflects in part the belief that the allocation of re- 
sources to correctional facilities is solely a legislative 
choice.'" There is also uneasiness about the courts' ability to  
rank priorities. 
But judicial enforcement of individual rights almost always 
has as a necessary consequence the reallocation of public funds, 
for that is the ultimate purpose of the 1itigatio1.1.~" Whether 
it be the indigent criminal defendant's constitutional plea for 
counsel at or on or for a free tran- 
script2" or other specialized a s s i s t a n ~ e ~ ~ ~  the increased ex- 
penditure of public funds is necessary. 
Prison litigation involves a more obvious, direct expendi- 
efforts of the legislative, executive, and administrative officials in Arkansas. 363 F. 
Supp. 194, 198-200 (E.D. Ark. 1973), a f d  in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Fimey v. 
Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974). The Trusty system had 
been abolished, and widespread unconstitutional conditions were no longer officially 
sanctioned. The State had acquired law libraries for both institutions and had 
retained a full-time physician to administer medical aid to the inmates. Id. 
283. Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 273, at 499. 
284. See Gerald E. Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 
715, 788 (1978); Paul J. Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 949, 970-71 (1978). 
285. See Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 273, a t  506-10. 
[Tlhe orders courts make in institutional cases will, almost inevitably, 
have as their consequence the increased expenditure of public hnds. This 
fact cannot serve to invalidate institutional litigation, however, because it 
proves too much. For a judicial order in almost any case has either as its 
aim or as its consequence the reallocation of resources. That is what 
litigation is for, 
Id. at  507. 
286. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
287. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
288. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
289. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). 
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ture of public funds. Budgetary considerations about the costly 
relief required to  remedy constitutional violations are often 
played out in the media. Perhaps, although never directly stat- 
ed, at the core of the familiar cry of judicial meddling is the 
belief that criminals have received their rightful punishment 
and the judiciary should just leave it alone. 
Fundamental questions of federal-state relations also arise 
when federal courts issue decrees that regulate state institu- 
t i o n ~ . ~ ~ ~  Critics fear too much federalism-that litigation in- 
volving state prisons has transgressed the rightful authority of 
the federal judiciary t o  act. Principles of federalism require a 
proper respect for state functions and demand that the federal 
government protect federal rights "in ways that will not unduly 
interfere with the legitimate activities of the States."291 
Like the decisions on separation of powers, the federal 
bench has shown a strong sensitivity to  issues of federalism. 
The comment by Judge Kane is revealing. 
[Tlhere is, from the beginning of my assignment to this case 
to the present time, a complete and utter distaste for having 
to cross that Rubicon which separates the federal government 
from the state government. . . . [Tlhe history which I have 
recounted shows that this circuit and district have shown 
great deference to prison officials, especially toward the Colo- 
rado State Penitentiary and the 150 cases that have been 
filed from there in the past three years. Nevertheless, the 
[prisoners] have presented substantial, oRen compelling, evi- 
dence of long existing and continuing constitutional viola- 
tions. Except in fashioning the necessary relief, deference is 
no longer possible.292 
No one even minimally acquainted with prison litigation 
can honestly suggest that the federal courts have been over- 
eager t o  interfere with the states' responsibility to administer 
their prisons or to usurp the legislative or executive task of 
running prisons.293 But, "the [federal] courts have learned 
290. See, eg., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled 
by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); Rizzo v. 
Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). But cf. 
Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 273, at 501-06 (distinguishing these decisions from 
most institutional cases). 
291. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44. 
292. Ramos v. Lamm, 485 F. Supp. 122, 132 (D. Colo. 1979), affd in part, set 
aside in part, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981). 
293. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 354 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in 
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from repeated investigation and bitter experience that [federal] 
judicial intervention is indispensable if constitutional dictates" 
are going to be observed in our nation's prisons.294 
"[Tlhe [wretched] inhumanity of conditions in American 
prisons has been thrust upon the judicial con~cience."~~ Fed- 
eral courts condemned entire state prison systems as unconsti- 
tutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend~nents.~~~ 
Chief Judge Johnson described in gruesome detail the horren- 
dous conditions in the Alabama penal system.297 Judge 
Holloway agreed with the lower court that the conditions in the 
maximum-security unit of the Colorado State Penitentiary were 
" ud5t for human habitation. "298 Chief Judge Pettine viewed 
the "barbaric physical conditions" of Rhode Island's prison 
system as "the ugly and shocking outward manifestations of a 
deeper dysfunction, an attitude of cynicism, hopelessness, pred- 
atory ~ e ~ s h n e s s ,  and callous indifference that appears to in- 
fect, to one degree or another, almost everyone who comes in 
contact with the [prison]."299 
Perhaps the most important schism on the Court is that a 
majority of the justices assume state legislatures and prison 
officials are sensitive to the requirements of the Constitu- 
tion,soO while the minority point to the sorry history of state 
prisons and believe that federal judicial intervention is "indis- 
pensable" to  preserve constitutional rights.301 Despite limited 
federal judicial pressure, slow but steady progress toward im- 
proving the constitutionality of the conditions of confinement in 
our nation's prisons has occurred. For the most part, despite 
their natural reluctance to see the changes come, prison admin- 
the judgment). 
294. Id. 
295. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 684 (D. 
Mass. 1973), afd, 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Hall v. Inmates 
of Suffolk County Jail, 419 U.S. 977 (1974). 
296. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 353 n.1, 354 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring in the 
judgment), for a list of the decisions that placed state prisons under court orders. 
297. Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 322-28 (M.D. Ala. 1976), afd as mdified 
sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part on other 
grounds sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (per curiam), and cert. dpnied 
sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 438 U.S. 915 (1978). 
298. Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 567 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 
1041 (1981). 
299. Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 984 (D. R.I. 1977), r e m a d d ,  599 
F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1979). 
300. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 352 (1981). 
301. See id. at 354, 358 n.7 (Breman, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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istrators acknowledge the significant part the federal judiciary 
has played in improving prisons.302 Judged by the results of 
the past two decades, the federal judiciary should be proud of 
its "activist" role. For in the end, the merits do matter.303 
VI. TOWARD REACHING A MUTUAL ACCOMMODATION 
A central theme t o  prison lore is "the fact that prisoners 
have privileges, not rights."304 This is personified by a sign 
that was posted in the dining room of The Women's House of 
Corrections in Chicago, Illinois: 
Words were made to be spoken 
Voices were made to be used 
If you speak lightly, and also politely, 
This privilege will not be abused.305 
Both the Pe~sylvania nd Auburn systems imposed a rule 
of absolute silence at all times.306 Although silence is no lon- 
ger the norm, other everyday activities that we take for grant- 
ed such as taking showers, receiving mail, laughing, smoking, 
and even eating arrangements become matters of reward in 
prison. 
Early in the nineteenth century, a reaction against capital 
and corporal punishment gave birth to  the American peniten- 
tiary, an institution marveled at and lavishly praised. By the 
1830s, the American penitentiary was world-famous. Yet, by 
the middle of that century, it was a "conceded failure."307 
Official reports proclaimed that "if human ingenuity were 
asked to devise means by which the most profligate of men 
might be rendered abandoned to the last degree of moral infa- 
302. See, eg., Davis, supra note 272, at Dl. Judge Anthony Alaimo's rulings 
"brought sweeping changes to the state's maximum-security prison" a t  Reidsville, 
Georgia. Unit supervisor Ronald Fountain, "a 15 year veteran of the state prison," 
proudly commented that "[tlhis is probably the best-equipped institution anywhere." 
Like others who worked at the state prison, "Mr. Fountain admitted he was initial- 
ly reluctant to see the changes come." Id. 
303. Reidsville was "a grim, foreboding place then," noted Judge Alaimo. During 
his surprise visit to Reidsville, "Judge Alaimo commented favorably on such im- 
provements as the well-stocked law library, the modern medical and dental facili- 
ties" and the overall well-tended appearance of the giant prison facility. Id. a t  D6. 
304. BURKHART, supm note 119, at 144. 
305. Id. 
306. See supra text accompanying notes 16-53 for a discussion of the Pennsyl- 
vania and Auburn systems. 
307. BROCKWAY, supra note 64, at  165. 
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my, nothing more effectual could be invented than the system 
then in vogue."308 
Today, as a t  the beginning, the most serious social conse- 
quence of the prison system is the disintegration of the human 
personality of those committed to its confines. The prisoners 
suffer from what may be called a loss of autonomy as they are 
constantly "subjected to a vast body of rules . . . which are de- 
signed to control their behavior in minute The de- 
privation of autonomy represents a serious threat to their 
self-image as adults. Regulation by a bureaucratic staff is seen 
by prisoners as pointless authoritarianism designed to bring 
them t o  their knees. Public humiliation and enforced respect 
for endless rules are all done in what is claimed to be the 
inmates' best interests. While attempting to "reimpose the 
subservience of youth,"1° the convicts are told to take their 
medicine like adults. As the normative form of punishment, 
imprisonment may not be much of an improvement over corpo- 
ral punishment. Even public flogging did not contribute to the 
degradation and disintegration of the human personality as 
much as conditions do in our prisons today. The Quakers had 
hoped to replace corporal punishment with solitary confine- 
ment, believing it more merciful, but convicts today face both 
the demoralization of their spirit and wanton acts of physical 
brutality. 
Our prisons increase the already anti-social behavior of 
their occupants. From the inmates' point of view, prison is a se- 
ries of status degradation ceremonies. Prison life lends itself to 
sexual perversions, general physical and moral disintegration, 
and sporadic rebellion against the system. Almost everything 
that could contribute to the debasement and demoralization of 
the human personality has been done in prison. 
The modern prison brings into play an anomalous number 
of disastrous influences. "Normal sociability is severely cur- 
tailed; self-assertion is practically denied; interesting work is 
rarely provided; play and recreation, if existent a t  all, are gro- 
tesquely inadequate.'"" Additionally, the normal sexual out- 
3 08. Id. 
309. GRESHAM . SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES: A STUDY OF A M A X I ~ J M  
SECIJRITY PRISON 73 (1958). See generally id. at 63-83. 
310. Id. at 76. 
311. HARRY E. BARNES, THE STORY OF PUNISHMENT 173 (Patterson Smith 2d ed. 
1972). 
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let is totally denied. The effects of all these factors are intensi- 
fied by the regimentation and emotional cruelty in today's 
conventional prison setting. As a consequence of the psychologi- 
cal effects inherent in our prisons, the inmates feel conscious 
resentment toward the system and those who put them into it. 
The result is not reformed prisoners, but rather persons who 
are ready to avenge themselves on society. 
The inmates in our prisons were, before being locked up, 
citizens in our democracy. Most will be released. The period of 
incarceration should be a time to encourage self-reliance and a 
sense of responsibility. We should spark an interest in the best 
that our democratic system has to offer. The Court should en- 
courage prison administrators to produce a climate where it is 
possible for the inmates to develop the traits society would like 
to see them possess on release from the institution. Unfortu- 
nately, the Court has set its compass in a different direction. 
Almost any restriction on the inmate may rationally be 
related to "institutional security" and the "effective manage- 
ment of the detention fa~i l i ty ."~ '~ " C O ~ S ~ ~ C U O U S ~ ~  lacking from 
[the Supreme Court's perspective] is any meaningful consider- 
ation of .  . . the impact that  restrictions may have on the in- 
m a t e ~ . " ~ ' ~  The Court is under an obligation "to examine the 
actual effect" of the conditions of confinement and restrictions 
upon the well-being of Proper attention must also 
be given to deprivations the inmates suffer. Ultimately, the 
Court's task is to determine whether the restriction comports 
with contemporary standards of human dignity. 
For example, nowhere are dignity concerns more acutely 
implicated than in the area of boddy integrity. Intrusive body 
searches generate feelings of "degradation" and 
Visual body cavity examinations engender a fear in inmates of 
physical and sexual abuse by prison Even though 
governmental security interests are strongest with respect to 
preventing dangerous weapons and contraband from entering 
the prison, the Court should rightfully pause, and then pause 
312. Bell v. WoKsh, 441 U.S. 520, 567 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
313. Id. at 563. 
314. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 367 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in 
the judgment). 
315. United States ex rel. WolFish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 
1977), affd  in part, reu'd and remanded in part sub nom. Wolfish v. Levi, 573 
F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1978), reu'd sub nom. Bell v. Wolfkh, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
316. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 577 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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again, when the net effect of its decision destroys any sem- 
blance of humanity that prisoners may hope to retain. 
In Wolfish, inmates a t  all Bureau of Prison facilities were 
routinely required "to expose their body cavities for visual in- 
spection as a part of a strip search conducted after every con- 
tact visit with a person from outside the in~ti tution."~'~ The 
practice was so "unpleasant, embarrassing, and humiliating," 
and placed inmates in such a degrading position that i t  caused 
some of them to forego visits with friends and family altogeth- 
er.318 There was testimony that the procedures may leave 
permanent, psychological scars.319 
Admittedly, this practice made the Court pause. Neither 
underestimating the degree to which these searches may in- 
vade the personal privacy of inmates, nor that on occasion they 
may be conducted in an abusive fashion, the Court still permit- 
ted them. The Court's balancing tests2' to determine reason- 
ableness under the Fourth Amendment gave way to the one 
critical factor: "A detention facility is a unique place fraught 
with serious security The fact that only one inci- 
dent of smuggling contraband in body cavities had been discov- 
ered was regarded as a testament to its effectiveness rather 
than an argument against its r ea~onab leness .~~~  
There is no doubt that this practice perpetuated the degra- 
dation and dehumanization of the inmates. On this most seri- 
ous issue, Justice Marshall charged that the majority ignored 
the examination of the particular facts in favor of absolute 
deference to the warden's interest in institutional securi- 
tySZ3 Did the Court examine the factual record with a view 
317. Id. at  558. "If the inmate is a male, he must lift his genitals and bend 
over to spread his buttocks for visual inspection. The vaginal and anal cavities of 
female inmates also are visually inspected. The inmate is not touched by security 
personnel at  any time during the visual search procedure." Id. at  558 n.39. 
318. United States ex reZ. Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. at  147. 
319. Id. 
320. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). 
In each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search 
against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts 
must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which 




322. See id. 
323. Id. at  578-79 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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toward reaching a "mutual accommodation," or was it just 
willing to wholeheartedly endorse the officials' raising the spec- 
ter of security until they were shown conclusively to be wrong? 
Were there less invasive methods of satisfying security 
needs?324 The dissenters examined the record and found far 
less necessity for routine body cavity searches. 
Before entering the visiting room, all visitors had their 
packages searched by hand, metal detectors, and a fluoroscope. 
To secrete contraband into a body cavity, an inmate would have 
had to remove half of his one-piece, front-zippered jumpsuit, 
while in plain view of guards who continuously monitored the 
glass-enclosed visiting room.325 Moreover, expert medical tes- 
timony suggested that inserting an  object into the rectum re- 
quired time and opportunity not available in the visiting room, 
and that it  would be painful. Of equal importance, once insert- 
ed, visual inspection probably would not detect the object.326 
Justice Marshall highlighted the bankruptcy of the majority's 
analysis and found that indiscriminate searches are "so unnec- 
essarily degrading that it 'shocks the conscience.' "=' More- 
over, the lower court found that less restrictive alternatives 
were available to ensure that contraband was not transferred 
during visits.328 Metal detectors could be used to discover 
weapons. In addition, the prisoners could be strip-searched, 
their clothing examined, and they could be required to present 
open hands and arms to reveal the absence of concealed ob- 
j e c t ~ . ~ ~ ~  The dissenters agreed with the district court that  
these alternative procedures "amply satiscied] the demands of 
324. Justice Rehnquist's sole alternative was to abolish contact visits altogether. 
Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 559 n.40. He expressed no view regarding the constitutionality 
of prohibiting contact visits for pretrial detainees. In Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 
576 (1984), the Court continued to reinforce its severe limitations on detainees, 
holding that they may be denied contact visits with their spouses, children, rela- 
tions, and friends. Id. at 585-89. Security concerns also permitted the majority to 
brusquely reject the challenge to the jail's policy of refusing to permit the 
detainees to observe searches of their cells. Id. at 589-91. 
325. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at  577-78 (Marshall, J., dissenting). To hrther security, 
the locked lavatories were forbidden fo the inmates, and the visitors could only use 
them with permission. The lavatories also contained a built-in window for inspec- 
tion. Id. at  578 n.18. 
326. Id. at 578. 
327. Id. at 578-79 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)). 
328. United States ex rel. WoEsh v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. at  147-48 (finding even 
anal searches ineffective). 
329. Id. at 147. 
330. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at  576-79 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. a t  595 (Stevens, 
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Humiliation had been an objective of the failed early 
systems.331 In order to maintain silence in the movement of 
large numbers of inmates about prisons, the Auburn system 
had subjected prisoners to the degradation of the lockstep. Pris- 
oners were out of step with society, and their physical move- 
ments were to be made as graceless as possible. Each prisoner 
moved silently, in a shuffle, his "right arm outstretched with 
the hand on the right shoulder of the man in front of him.''332 
Prisoners were "not permitted to hold their heads up, as would 
befit free men."333 With their heads turned to the right, and 
their eyes cast downward as they shuffled forward, they were 
constantly reminded of their low estate.334 
We should reject the past and preserve human dignity in 
prison. Current prison practices that blithely contribute to the 
prisoners' virtual degradation by design or neglect are to be 
condemned. It is difficult to believe that the reason for the 
visual body cavity search is solely for security and not also to 
purposefully demoralize and humiliate the inmate. 
The Court's policy has allowed not only degradation but 
also deprivation of the very elements needed to reform the 
prisoner. The "hands-off' doctrine had failed the prisoners by 
abdicating jurisdiction. The deferential model likewise fails by 
abandoning the Court's responsibility. 
O'Lone u. Estate of S h a b a ~ z ~ ~ ~  highlights the substitution 
of judicial rhetoric for any meaningful scrutiny of prisoners' 
constitutional claims. The Court's analytical framework com- 
pletely prevented the inmates from attending the central reli- 
gious service of their Muslim faith. Rather than trying to reach 
a mutual accommodation, the Court's "reasonableness" stan- 
dard became nothing more than "reflexive deference to prison 
officials."336 
"Religion represents a rich resource in the moral and spiri- 
J., dissenting). Justice Powell joined the majority except with respect to body-cavity 
searches. He stated that the serious intrusion on one's privacy occasioned by anal 
and genital searches required "at least some level of cause, such as a reasonable 
suspicion." Id. at 563 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
331. HARRY E. BARNES & NEGLEY K. TEETERS, NEW HORIZONS IN CRIMINOLOGY 
351 (3d ed. 1959). 
332. ATTICA, supra note 38, at 10. 
333. Id. at 11. 
334. Id. 
335. 482 U.S. 342 (1987); see supra text accompanying notes 248-58 for a discus- 
sion of O'Lone. 
336. O'hne, 482 US. at 367 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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tual regeneration of and in prison it serves a re- 
habilitative function. The Quakers, who began the reform 
movement, believed in the reformation of the inmate's spirit 
through religious study and repentance. Although all contact 
with fellow prisoners and community was prevented, prisoners 
in the Pennsylvania system were given religious instruction by 
ministers. Even the stern Auburn system applied the accepted 
doctrine that criminals in prison should be provided with reli- 
gious services.338 Religion provides the means to spiritual re- 
covery by which "the inmate may reclaim his dignity and reas- 
sert his ind i~ idua l i ty . "~~~ 
The Ozone Court's task was to frame society's values, giv- 
ing the fullest measure of constitutional protections consistent 
with institutional needs. Muslim inmates are permitted to take 
part in Jumu'ah throughout the entire federal prison system. 
Moreover, the Leesburg state prisoners had, for five years, been 
permitted to participate in the Jumu'ah without creating any 
threats to security or to the safety of the institution.340 Con- 
sidering Leesburg's experience, the standard federal practice, 
and given the institution's responsibility to provide Muslims 
with a "reasonable opportunity of pursuing [their] faith compa- 
rable to the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere 
to conventional religious preceptsY4l surely the Court could 
have found a mutual accommodation to satisfy all needs. The 
Muslim prisoners had proposed plausible alternatives that 
federal prisons and other courts, in strikingly similar circum- 
stances, had accepted.34" 
337. AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL SS'N, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS at  
xxi (3d ed. 1966) (preamble principle XVII). 
338. See ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 104. 
339. Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
340. O'hne, 482 U.S. at  366 (&eman, J., dissenting). 
341. Cruz v. Betd, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (per curiam). 
342. O'hne, 482 U.S. a t  361, 363-67 (Breman, J., dissenting). The prisoners 
alternatively proposed that Muslim inmates "be assigned to an alternative inside 
work detail on Friday," id. at  363; that they "be assigned to work details inside 
the main building on a regular basis," id. at 364; that they "be assigned to Satur- 
day or Sunday work details," id. a t  365 (this would allow them to make up time 
lost by attending Jumu'ah on Friday); or that minimum-security inmates "be as- 
signed to jobs either in the Farm building or in its immediate vicinity," id. at 365- 
66 & n.6 (this would avoid increasing congestion at  the main gate, a concern un- 
derlying the no-return policy). 
"Muslim inmates are able to participate in Jumu'ah throughout the entire fed- 
eral prison system." Id. at 362. Federal Bureau of Prisons regulations and direc- 
tives require that "the more central the religious activity is to the tenets of the 
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The Pennsylvania advocates were convinced that separat- 
ing the convicts from all evil influences and corrupt compan- 
ions was the key to their rehabilitation. To f a l l  this goal, 
they severed every tie between the prisoners and the communi- 
ty and sought to block out reports of outside events.343 Thus 
they were kept in complete isolation. The Auburn system was 
as devoted as Pennsylvania to the idea of isolating the prison- 
ers from each other and from the- outside world. The "silent 
system" contemplated an  end to free communication within the 
penitentiary. The prisoners were rarely allowed to communi- 
cate or visit with their families.344 The prisoner "was taught 
to consider himself dead to all without the prison 
Today's theory is totally contrary to the early view. Author- 
ities that deal closely with penal reform counsel correctional 
institutions "to maximize visiting opportunities for in- 
m a t e ~ . " ~ ~ ~  The decrease of recichvism and the subsequent 
reentry of the inmate into society may well depend upon his 
maintaining ties to the community. Of equal importance to the 
inmate and his relatives is that the family unit remain intact. 
Admittedly, there may be valid reasons to believe that 
visitation rights have been abused in a particular case, and 
prison officials should take reasonable steps to investigate and 
to .correct that situation. The inmates in Kentucky Department 
of Corrections v. Thompson, however, did not ask for unfettered 
visitation, but merely for rudimentary procedural safeguards 
against retaliatory or arbitrary denial of visits from family and 
The Thompson Court's answer was that visits could be 
denied without justification. The Court gave correctional au- 
thorities unbridled discretion over the "basic human need" of 
inmate's religious faith, the greater the presumption is for relieving the inmate 
from the institution program or assignment." Id. at  362 (citing respondent's brief at  
8a). Furthermore, the Chaplain Director of the Bureau stated that "[iln those in- 
stitutions where the outside work details contain Islamic inmates, they are permit- 
ted access to the inside of the institution to attend the Jumu-ah." Id. at  362 (cit- 
ing respondent's brief at la). 
343. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, a t  94-95. Interestingly, in the early English and 
American jails, widespread visitation practices were permitted. See Leverson, supra 
note 16, at  413-15. 
344. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at  94-95. 
345. Id. at 95. 
346. FEDERAL STANDARDS FOR PRISONS AND JAILS 9 12.12 (US. Dep't of Justice 
1980); see also Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 468 n.4 
(1989) (citing additional authorities). 
347. Thompson, 490 U.S. at 475 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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the prisoner to see his family and friends.348 Consequently, 
today, visitation remains merely a privilege.349 
The continued necessity for correctional personnel to exer- 
cise broad discretion in maintaining order and security cannot 
be questioned. Respect for state institutions and administrative 
guidance is relevant in prison litigation. But, the slow pace of 
prison litigation and the substantial guidance sought and se- 
cured from correctional officials in framing adequate proce- 
dures manifest sufficient deference to the states and prison 
 administration^.^^^ The fundamental question is not that of 
respect, but of who should make the final determination about 
the conditions our fellow citizens face while incarcerated. To 
permit the states and prison authorities to do so is to abdicate 
federal judicial responsibility. 
The Supreme Court, by failing to act, legitimizes the status 
quo. By setting unrealistic barriers for review of Eighth 
Amendment rights, the Court discourages constitutional inqui- 
ry and encourages abuse.351 The gravamen of the Eighth 
Amendment is the effect upon the imprisoned. Humane consid- 
erations and constitutional requirements are not to be mea- 
sured by the public fisc. Charged with the duty of enforcing the 
Constitution, the federal courts must continue t o  be available 
to force the states to correct their unconstitutional prison condi- 
tions. If Wilson's deliberate indifference theory is employed t o  
insulate judicial review because conscientious prison adminis- 
trators seek t o  improve their facilities, even while state legisla- 
tures refuse to spend scarce tax dollars t o  bring conditions in 
outdated prisons up to minimally acceptable s t andard~ ,3~~  
348. Id. at 466. 
349. See supra text accompanying notes 263-68 for a discussion of Thompson. In 
prison, even the quantity of sugar or milk in coffee is a privilege of some conse- 
quence: 
"I went to get sugar for my oatmeal," Marlene Riffert says. "I took a 
spoonfbl and then the matron came up and took my bowl away and 
threw the cereal in the garbage. I was so shocked, I didn't say anything, 
I just looked at her. She said, You know you already used sugar in your 
coffee.' I was given three nights' early bed." Marlene had violated a sacro- 
sanct rule at  the House of Correction in Philadelphia: she attempted to 
use sugar in her coffee and on her cereal at  breakfast. Her option was 
one or the other, not both. 
BIJHKHART, supra note 119, at  144-45. 
350. Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 273, at 506. 
351. See Hirschkop & Millemam, supra note 275, at 835-37. 
352. See Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2331 (1991) (White, J., concurring in 
the judgment). 
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then imprisonment will be an open door for cruelty and neglect. 
But, if deliberate indifference may be satisfied by showing a 
legislative failure to reevaluate its correctional policy and cor- 
red  some of its worst penal systems, then it will not impede 
prison reform. The history of prison litigation attests to this 
assertion. 
When evaluating whether prison conditions pass constitu- 
tional muster, the touchstone should be the actual effect upon 
the well-being of the imprisoned. In performing this responsi- 
bility, the courts must carefully scrutinize the challenged condi- 
tion, applying realistic yet humane standards.353 The cumula- 
tive impact of the conditions of incarceration that threaten the 
physical and emotional health of the inmates, and not the bud- 
get, should determine whether the conditions violate the Con- 
s t i t ~ t i o n . ~ ~ ~  
The model the Court uses and its standard of review for 
prison regulations also have fundamental consequences. When 
the standard may be satisfied by merely showing a "'logical 
connection' between the regulation and any legitimate 
penological concern perceived by a cautious warden," then "it is 
virtually meaningle~s."~" A prisoner's constitutional rights 
should not be disregarded whenever the warden can articulate 
a plausible security concern.35" 
It is ironic that although this Article argues for a greater 
judicial role, it is the Supreme Court, as final arbiter, that has 
continuously impeded the efforts of the lower federal courts to 







1n Rhodes, Justice Brennan noted: 
The court must examine the effect upon inmates of the condition of the 
physical plant (lighting, heat, plumbing, ventilation, living space, noise 
levels, recreation space); sanitation (control of vermin and insects, food 
preparation, medical facilities, lavatories and showers, clean places for 
eating, sleeping, and working); safety (protection from violent, deranged, 
or diseased inmates, fire protection, emergency evacuation); inmate needs 
and services (clothing, nutrition, bedding, medical, dental, and mental 
health care, visitation time, exercise and recreation, educational and reha- 
bilitative programming); and staffing (trained and adequate guards and 
other staff, avoidance of placing inmates in positions of authority over 
other inmates). 
U.S. at  364 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 100 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring in part 
dissenting in part). 
Id. at 100-01. 
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further prison reform. If the Court is sincere in its proclama- 
tion that prison walls are not barriers separating inmates from 
constitutional protections:57 then it must demand more of 
the warden. Considerations of security and administrative 
expense are factors to weigh, but are not necessarily disposi- 
tive. A limitation on constitutional rights requires more than a 
"reflexive deference to prison  official^."^" The basic premise 
is that prisoners, as members of society, retain constitutional 
rights that limit the exercise of official authority aimed against 
them.359 An approach more sensitive to the retained rights of 
the inmate is required. An open mind to alternative methods of 
accommodating constitutional concerns, with a view that any 
limitation on freedom should be no greater than absolutely 
necessary to accomplish the correctional needs, is more in ac- 
cord with the Court's declared commitment.360 Although the 
regulation may be "reasonable," there may be better alterna- 
tives. 
Regulations that unnecessarily degrade the prisoner, limit 
his access to family and friends, restrict his desire to worship, 
and frustrate his ability to gain a modicum of self-respect, ill 
prepare him for his return to society. At a minimum, the pris- 
oner retains the right to be treated with human dignity. When 
this right is no greater than the warden chooses to permit, 
then surely the prisoner is still not much better than the past 
century description of him as "the slave of the State."361 
357. Turner, 482 U.S. at 84. 
358. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 367 (1987) (Brennan, J., dis- 
senting). 
359. Id. at  355. 
360. See Part I of Justice Brennan's dissent in n o n e ,  482 U.S. a t  3.5449 
( B r e ~ a n ,  J., dissenting). Judge Kaufman in Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 
1015, 1033 (2d Cir. 1985), believed that the prison official must show that "a par- 
ticular restriction is necessary to further an important governmental interest, 
and . . . the limitations on freedoms occasioned by the restriction are no greater 
than necessary to effectuate the governmental objective involved." Id. The degree of 
scrutiny should depend upon "the nature of the right being asserted by prisoners, 
the type of activity in which they seek to engage, and whether the challenged 
restriction works a total deprivation (as opposed to a mere limitation) on the exer- 
cise of that right." Id. 
361. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871). Our prison 
population is predominantly black, and black prisoners, with their increased sensi- 
tivity to black slave history, have perceived the close analogy between imprison- 
ment and slavery. See Herman Schwartz, Prisoner's Rights: Some Hopes and Reali- 
ties, in W J A L  CHIEF JIJSTICE EARL WARREN CONFERENCE ON ADVOCACY IN THE 
UNITED STATES, A PROGRAM FOR PRISON REFORM 56 (1972). 
